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The Indian economy has received considerable interest in economic research in
the last decade. Economic liberalization, greater participation in world trade and
the availability of long panel of rm level data has encouraged empirical work on
the Indian economy. My research adds to this growing empirical literature on the
behavior and performance of Indian rms post liberalization.
This thesis comprises three chapters. In the rst chapter, I provide a brief
summary of reforms in India, review some of the papers analyzing rm behavior
and performance and put it in the perspective of the liberalization process in India.
The literature on Indian liberalization and on various aspects of rm behavior
and performance is plentiful. I have limited my review to the papers which have
inuenced my research.
In the second chapter, I analyze the relationship between nancial constraints
faced by the Indian manufacturing rms and their export participation decision. I
nd that the rms that enter the export market are nancially healthier than the
rms that cater only to the domestic market. I also verify that nancial health is
the cause and not a consequence of exports.
In the last chapter, I address the relationship between rm size and its to-
tal factor productivity in the Indian manufacturing industries (co-authored with
Prabal De). While small rms have the advantage of smaller and more exible
management and lower response time to market changes, larger rms have advan-
tages of economies of scale, political clout and better access to government credits,
contracts and licenses, particularly in developing countries. We nd that small
Indian rms are more productive than their larger counterparts
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CHAPTER 1
LIBERALIZATION AND FIRM BEHAVIOR - THE INDIAN
CONTEXT
1.1 Economic Liberalization in India
Post independence, Indias development strategy was two pronged - one, to set
up core industries to produce basic manufacturing infrastructure like energy, ma-
chinery, automobiles, chemicals and other capital goods; and the other, to develop
small enterprises all across the country to produce consumption goods and provide
employment.
As part of its planned development program, the government owned a large
proportion of the manufacturing plants. Private enterprises had to obtain licenses
to set up manufacturing plants or to expand operations. Prices and distribution
of most commodities were regulated by the government. Many industries were re-
served for small enterprises. While this centralized planning system was successful
in establishing the core industries, it also led to ine¢ ciencies. Investment ceilings
and reservation for small industries proved to be a disincentive to growth. Inef-
ciencies and shortages resulted in higher prices. Loss-making public enterprises
were subsidized by the government contributing to increasing government decits.
Pre-emptive use of public savings by the government to monetize its decits and
governments policy directing credit towards subsidized sectors at the expense of
the private sector stied economic growth. Ahluwalia (1985) analyzes the stagna-
tion in Indias industrial sector pre-reforms.
The nancial markets were underdeveloped and highly regulated. Excessive
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structural and micro regulations led to a distorted interest rate mechanism. The
lack of market driven norms and lack of transparency a¤ected the protability of
the banks as well. There was a massive increase in the Non Performing Assets
(NPAs) of the banks (Mathur, 2007; Koeva, 2003). This kind of banking and
nancial system led to a McKinnon - Shaw1 kind of ine¢ ciency in the repressed
nancial market and posed credit constraints on the productive rms 2.
The Indian government initiated economic reforms in the 1980s. However, by
1991 mounting government debt led the economy to the brink of insolvency. The
government agreed to IMFs recommendation of a systematic liberalization of its
industrial, trade and nancial policies.
As part of industrial liberalization the government did away with licensing
requirements for most industries except for strategic industries such as defense, es-
sential drugs and pharmaceuticals. Government eliminated investment ceiling that
had prevented capacity expansion by manufacturing rms beyond stipulated limits.
It opened up industries for private participation that were previously exclusively
reserved for the public sector. It also divested its holdings in such industries. It
further reduced the number of industries reserved for small enterprises and changed
the denition of small enterprises to accommodate rms with larger asset sizes3.
Sharma (2008) describes the changes in the industrial policy undertaken by the
Indian government during this period.
Under trade liberalization, the government allowed imports of previously re-
1McKinnon & Shaw refer to an economy with controlled nancial markets where the interest
rates are held articially low and credit is rationed; which leads to misallocation of funds. A
higher but market-determined interest rates and a unied capital market with competition will
improve the quality of investments in such an economy. (Mckinnon 1973).
2Please refer Sen & Vaidya, 1999 for a detailed analyses of the reforms in the Indian nancial
sector.
3In India, size of an enterprise is dened by its asset size (value of plant and machinery and
other equipments).
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Figure 1.1: Credit as a Percentage of GDP
stricted items. It reduced import duties and simplied the duty structure. It also
abolished license requirement for importers.
As part of nancial liberalization, the government took multiple steps in the
banking sector. It encouraged the privatization of the banking sector by divest-
ing in public sector banks and allowing private sector banks (including foreign
banks) to operate. While the government allowed greater exibility to the banks
in their term deposits and loans o¤ering, it mandated better accounting standards
to increase transparency and reduce non-performing assets. As part of nancial
liberalization, the government reduced its administrative control over interest rates
and made government borrowings from the public more transparent and at market
rates. Figure 1 shows that not only did the banking system provide more credit
over the years but also that a larger proportion of this credit was o¤ered to the
private sector. It allowed foreign equity in many industries and also allowed rms
to raise equity in foreign markets. Figure 2 shows the increase in the amount of
equity and debt raised in the international market.
As these changes were implemented over a period of time, Indias liberalization
has often been called "gradualist" in nature. Though licensing was done away with
3
Figure 1.2: Equity and Debt Raised in International Markets
for many industries on a single day, most other changes were made over a period
of ten years. In spite of the modest pace of reforms, there has been a substantial
bearing on the behavior and performance of Indian rms.
Panagariya (2004) summarizes and compares the early reforms of 1980s to
those of the 1990s. He contends that the reforms of 1980s did fuel output and
productivity growth but that growth could not have been sustained without more
reforms. He further states that the industrial growth after the reforms of the
1990s have been lackluster due to draconian labor laws and continued reservation
for small enterprises.
Bollard, Klenow and Sharma (2012) nd sizeable productivity growth (about
5 percent per annum) in large Indian rms post reforms. They call it Indias
"mysterious manufacturing miracle" as they nd that the e¤ect of reforms account
for a negligible portion of the productivity growth. The increase in productivity
is due to the changes within rms and not due to the post-reform reallocation of
resources from low productivity rms to high productivity rms. They state that
the short length of their data, their metrics for the policy reforms and the fact that
the e¤ects of the reforms take longer to show in the data could have contributed
4
to the surprising results.
Morris and Basant (2006) analyze the impact of banking sector reforms on the
availability of funds for private sector rms, especially small enterprises. They nd
that most of the foreign direct investment has gone to larger rms. Though the
gross domestic savings of the economy as a whole went up, the proportion of this
savings going to the banking sector reduced, as most of it was sponged o¤by other
small saving schemes like mutual funds. The non-banking sector invested these
small savings mostly in the larger rms. Thus, small rms have been starved of
nances, notwithstanding the increase in the economys gross domestic savings.
Topalova (2004) gives a detailed summary of the corporate sectors growth post
reforms. She nds that in the two decades following industrial liberalization in
1991, the number of registered rms and paid up capital grew steadily. In spite
of the growth in the number of private rms, their paid up capital comprised only
about one-third of the corporate sector. The fewer government owned rms still
accounted for a large part of the paid up capital. She nds that Indian rms
performed well for a period of ve to seven years after the reforms, but the growth
showed signs of weakening especially with poor nancial health of the rms, as I
mention in the next section.
The above mentioned papers, underscore the need for further reforms. The re-
forms of the 1990s encouraged private enterprise only to some extent. For sustained
economic growth it is important to not just increase the availability of capital but
also improve its allocation amongst rms. This in turn will promote small and
medium enterprises for a more equitable and broad-based growth. Economic pol-
icy also needs to encourage trade. Both import and exports improves e¢ ciency of
the rms and open up a wider marketplace for them.
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In the following sections, I concentrate on some of these factors. Specically,
I look at the theoretical and empirical o¤erings on the analyses of rm behavior
and performance especially in the context of the Indian economy. In the rst
section, I review the literature on nancial constraints and rm behavior, in the
second I focus on trade and rm behavior and in the last on performance of small
enterprises.
1.2 Financial Constraints and Firm Behavior
There is a large body of work on nancial constraints and rm behavior. One
paper which contributed to this literature is Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988),
hereafter called FHP. FHP nds that in the presence of capital market distortions,
internal and external sources of capital are not perfect substitutes. In the face
of nancial constraints, internal funds have a cost advantage over external funds.
Therefore, a rms investment decision depends on its nancing decision. This is
especially true for smaller and younger rms due to the presence of information
asymmetries in capital markets. FHP studies a panel of US rms and show that
rmsinvestment decision is sensitive to the balance sheet measure of liquidity.
If information asymmetries could trigger nancial constraints for small rms,
an underdeveloped nancial market would only worsen it. Presence of nancial
constraints and its inuence on rmsinvestment decision for a developing econ-
omy is analyzed by Tybout (1983). Tybout builds a theoretical investment model
incorporating cost of liquidity and tests this model on Columbian data. He stud-
ies the impact of credit rationing (credit directed to certain sectors/industries of
the economy to the neglect of others) on investment behavior of Columbian rms.
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He nds that for rms which are not favored under the credit rationing regime
(therefore face an increased marginal cost of borrowing) investment outlay is more
closely tied to availability of liquid internal funding. This result is especially true
for small rms. Nabi (1989) nds that manufacturers of farm machinery in Pak-
istan that do not have access to low cost capital in the organized capital markets
are unable to realize their investment plans as compared to those that can. He
uses the presence of an organized capital markets (comprising banks and nancial
institutions) and the unorganized and informal lending institutions (community
chit funds 4) to identify rms with credit constraints.
The papers described above establish the impact of nancial constraints on
investment behavior in both developed and underdeveloped economies. To ad-
dress the problem of credit constraints in underdeveloped nancial markets, many
emerging economies have initiated reforms in the nancial sector. This leads us to
examine if nancial reforms improve e¢ ciency in investment allocation.
Jaramillo, Schianterelli and Weiss (1993) study the e¤ects of liberalization in
the nancial markets on performance of individual rms in Ecuador. Specically,
they study the e¤ect of removal of administrative control over interest rates and
elimination or scaling down of directed credit programs on nancial constraints
of individual rms. They estimate a modied Euler equation for investment 
modied to adjust for increased leverage of nancially constrained rms. They nd
that nancial reforms did not have much e¤ect on nancial constraints faced by
rms. However, they state that a short length of data and macroeconomic changes
in Ecuador inuencing the e¤ect of nancial reforms in the economy might have
a¤ected these results.
4Chit funds are specied persons in a group who contribute a specic sum of money in
periodical installments and each person is entitled to the prize money at his turn.
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Gallindo, Schianterelli and Weiss (2003) analyze the above relationship using
rm level panel data from twelve developing economies including India. They
build an index of e¢ ciency of allocation of investment funds. They nd that post
liberalization allocation in these countries has been more e¢ cient.
Athey and Laumas (1994) examine the importance of internal funds and de-
preciation for investment by manufacturing rms in India. They nd that both
depreciation and availability of internal funds have signicant explanatory power
in explaining rm level investments. They nd that internal funds are relatively
more important for large rms. Their study does not capture the post reform
changes.
Topalova (2004) looks at the reforms undertaken in India in the 90s and evalu-
ates the nancial vulnerabilities of rms post reforms. She nds an initial improve-
ment of nancial indicators followed by a worsening in most of these indicators.
She nds that Indian rms are highly leveraged and a higher proportion of the
total borrowings were short term debt. Indian rms also became less liquid in that
time period- their current ratio (current asset to current liabilities) worsened from
1.64 in 1990 to 1.49 in 2001. The number of rms with current ratio lower than
one, that is the rms who could not meet their current liability with their current
assets rose 11 percent in 1989 to 27 percent in 2002. The share of companies that
were unable to generate enough cash to meet their interest payment rose from 15
the sample used in 1989 to 31 percent in 2002. This was in spite of interest rates
remaining constant.
Gupta, Hasan and Kumar (2008) analyze the constraints on growth of the
manufacturing sector in India post reforms. They conclude that growth in the
Indian manufacturing sector has been heterogeneous and that lack of infrastructure
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development and nancial sector development has adversely a¤ected the growth
of many industries.
The papers above underscore the importance of availability of credit for rms
investment decision and also indicate the presence of credit constraints faced by
rms in India even in the post reforms period.
1.3 Trade and Firm Behavior
There have been many papers on the e¤ects of international trade. I examine
only the ones which study the e¤ect on rm performance. International trade has
an impact on not just the amount of imports and exports of the rm but also
the variety and quality of products it manufactures, the productivity of the rms,
increase in investment on technology and research and development and impact of
reforms on labor outcomes. Recent empirical literature on trade and rm behavior
has benetted from two papers; Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and
Kortum (2003). I will address the latter as BEJK. Both these papers explain the
relation between trade and plant productivity.
Melitz shows how the presence of sunk costs of entry into the export market,
separates rms into non-exporting and exporting rms. Only more productive
rms, which are able to undertake the investment of market entry, will remain in
the export market. The less productive will cater only to the domestic market and
the least productive will exit the industry. This churning of rms by productivity
level will increase the aggregate productivity of the industry. An economy opening
up to international trade or undertaking trade reforms to increase exports, will
therefore, experience an increase in aggregate productivity.
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BEJK also demonstrate that exporting requires a higher productivity level
than catering only to the domestic market. They build a multi country trade
model introducing imperfect competition in the Ricardian set-up. They combine
transportation costs, costs of inputs, heterogenous productivity and elasticity of
substitutions to determine the joint distribution of costs and mark-ups. They t
their model to the US rm data and run simulations that show that only more
productive rms export.
A number of other papers have illustrated how trade has improved productivity.
Amiti and Konnings (2006) show how imports of intermediate inputs increase
productivity of rms in Indonesia. They compare gains in plant productivity from
a fall in nal goods tari¤ to the gain from the reduction in tari¤s on intermediate
goods. Imported inputs raise productivity via learning, variety and quality of
inputs whereas a fall in output tari¤ raises productivity via increased competition.
They nd that productivity increase linked to fall in tari¤s of intermediate inputs
is twice as high as that from fall in tari¤s on nal goods.
Khandelwal and Topalova (2011) conduct a similar study for Indian manufac-
turing rms. They too compare the e¤ect of lower input tari¤ to lower output
tari¤ on productivity. They conduct this study on Indian manufacturing rms,
pre and post trade reforms. They nd that though tari¤ reduction on both input
and output has a positive e¤ect on productivity, reduction of input tari¤ has a
stronger inuence on productivity.
Trade also inuences the variety and quality of goods produced in the economy.
Grossman and Helpman (1990) provide a detailed model analyzing the e¤ects of
trade on innovation. They mention the various conditions under which trade pro-
motes innovation. They dene innovation in terms of quality of the same set of
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products and in terms of wider range of di¤erentiated products (variety of prod-
ucts). Their analysis provides the theoretical background for further empirical
work.
Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik and Topalova (2011) examine the e¤ect of trade
on number of products for Indian rms. They study the impact of declining import
tari¤ costs and imports of intermediate inputs on increase in the number of nal
goods produced by Indian rms post trade reform. Input tari¤s were reduced
di¤erentially across sectors. The industries which experienced the largest declines
in input tari¤ contributed most to the introduction of new products. They nd
that lower input tari¤s of intermediate inputs account for 31 percent of the new
products introduced by domestic rms that imported these intermediate inputs.
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011) in their forthcoming paper analyze the
impact of trade on selection of rms into the export market and selection of prod-
ucts by the exporting rms. They develop a general equilibrium model where only
the most productive rms export and the exporting rms export only the most
protable products. This churning of rms and products due to trade increases
the aggregate industry productivity. They use US transaction level trade data to
test their model and nd strong support for many of the implications of the model.
There is also a sizeable amount of work establishing the relationship between
total factor productivity and export participation (Roberts and Tybout, 1997;
Bernard, Eaton et al, 2003; Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Baldwin and Gu, 2003). The
work on nancial constraints and export participation is still nascent and sparse.
Paravisini, et al (2011) analyze the e¤ect of credit shortage following a nancial
crisis on exports of Peruvian rms. They nd no e¤ect on the extensive margin but
a fall in the intensive margin of exports. Muuls (2008) builds a heterogeneous rm
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model with liquidity constraint and links it to the pecking order of exports (rms
exporting to the smallest and furthest away economies are more productive and less
credit constrained) and the e¤ect of currency appreciation. She empirically tests
her model on Belgian rms using credit scores by a private credit insurance rm, as
the measure of liquidity. She nds that rms that have higher productivity levels
and lower nancial constraints are more likely to export. Greenaway, Guariglia
and Kneller (2007) analyze the e¤ect of credit constraint on export participation
decision. They study rms in the UK for a ten-year period. They nd nancial
health to be an outcome rather than a determinant of entry into the export market.
Berman and Hericourt (2010) study this relationship for a number of countries for
three consecutive years. They nd nancial health to be a determinant rather
than an outcome of export-market entry decision. Minetti and Zhu (2011) study
the impact of credit rationing on rms export performance for Italian rms using
a survey data for the year 2001. They nd that rms that said they were credit
rationed had a lower probability of exporting. Bernard and Jensen (2004), (referred
to as BJ now on) study a panel of US manufacturing plants and analyze their
exporting decision. They nd plant characteristics and past exporting experience
to be very inuential in the exporting decision. I follow their methodology closely
as described in the empirical section.
The study of this relation between nancial constraints and export participation
is very important in the context of developing countries. Trade, and specically
export promotion, is important for the growth of developing economies. Other
than India a number of developing economies have consciously replaced import
substitution policies with export promotion policies in the last two decades. Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Turkey are some examples of economies pursuing trade reforms.
However, trade liberalization by itself is not su¢ cient to promote exports. Fi-
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nancial constraints faced by rms act as an entry barrier to exports. Therefore,
understanding the relation between nancial constraints and export participation
is critical to trade policy decisions. In the next chapter, I address this relation be-
tween nancial constraints faced by rms and their export market entry decision.
1.4 Firm Size and Performance
As mentioned earlier, the Indian government gave the growth and development
of small enterprises considerable importance. This policy of the government did
contribute to the growth of and employment generation by the small enterprises. At
the same time, this policy has often been criticized for discouraging investment by
these enterprises and the lack of their growth to become mid sized rms. The policy
has also been criticized for directing credit away for potentially more productive
projects.
The question of whether the government should promote and protect smaller
rms needs, among others, a careful analysis of the productivity of smaller rms
relative to the larger ones. Smaller rms su¤er from scale disadvantages, lower
access to credit and necessary political clouts to inuence policy (Tybout, 2000).
At the same time, there is evidence that smaller rms generate more patents per
capita, and have more exible management style and agility to adapt to technology
changes (Dhawan, 2001).
In one of the earliest papers, Williamson (1967) captured this trade-o¤ in a
model of hierarchical control; where the benets of increasing returns from growing
in size are countervailed by the increasing cost of managerial complexity. The
models that followed, built on this advantage of small rms  leaner and more
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exible management. Further, small rms can be more receptive and adaptive to
new technology. One advantage of having a smaller scale is that the production
process is less deeply entrenched in existing technology. Dhawan (2001) provides
an excellent summary of the theoretical arguments for small rms being more
productive.
Jovanovic (1982) proposed an early theorization of small rms being more e¢ -
cient. In this world, price-taking rms enter the industry knowing the distribution
of cost, but ignorant about their individual draws. After the idiosyncratic e¢ ciency
draw is made, a rm discovers whether it is e¢ cient enough to survive and grow or
not. Firms with bad draws leave the industry, leaving more e¢ cient rms to oper-
ate. As a result, in the observed data, small rms appear most e¢ cient. However,
this line of research focuses on cost e¢ ciency and not total factor productivity.
Idson and Oi (1999) argue that workers in large rms reap the benets of in-
creasing returns (brought in by big volumes) by having less idled time and produc-
ing more. There is some related literature on Gibrats Law, which states that rms
grow at rates that are independent of their sizes. However, there is no implication
for productivity. Tybout (2000) also attributes the (potential) higher productiv-
ity of large rms in developing countries to variables like increasing returns and
lobbying power.
There are two strands of a related literature that emphasizes a rms size in
inuencing variables that potentially a¤ect productivity. The rst is access to
credit. Information asymmetries and underdeveloped nancial markets, common
in developing countries, limit small rmsaccess to nance. In a rm-level survey
of 54 countries Beck et al (2005) nd that nancial, legal and corruption problems
limit the growth of the small rms. This provides a channel through which size
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may matter for productivity. A second channel is the link between investment in
research, innovation and productivity. While large rms are nancially able to
invest in research and development at a large scale, there is evidence that research
investment by smaller rms is more e¢ cient, for example, in terms of generation
of number of patents.
Empirical evidence on size-performance relationship too has been mixed. A
summary of the extant literature is also complicated by the fact that a wide variety
of measures of productivity and rm size has been used in the literature. For
instance, the most popular metric of rm size has been employment, regardless of
its output, asset or market share. Similarly, labor productivity has often been used
instead of total factor productivity. Finally, apart from productivity, a variety of
indicators of performance such as prot rate, employment, survival and growth
have been used.
For rms in the United States, Dhawan (2001) found results that are largely
similar to those of ours - smaller rms are more productive, but are less likely to
survive compared to their larger counterparts. Baily et al. (1996) found that if we
measure a rms size in terms of employment, then rms getting smaller (in other
words, downsizing) did not gain productivity.
Size heterogeneity in developing countries too is a pervasive phenomenon. In-
dustries within the manufacturing sectors in developing countries have been char-
acterized by size-heterogeneity of such high degree that Tybout (2000) calls it a
form of dualism. Unfortunately, the evidence in terms of size and performance in
these countries is limited in nature. This is not surprising, because many develop-
ing countries either lack a signicant manufacturing sector, or dependable data, or
both. Fortunately, with both growth in industry and better data collection, new
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research is coming up.
In Asia, studying Taiwanese rms, Aw (2000) found that small rms no less
productive than their larger counterparts. In a related study, Aw et al. (2001)
also found that small and medium size rms contribute a signicant amount to
the productivity growth of the industries they inhabit. In Africa, analyzing manu-
facturing rms in nine African countries, Van Biesebroeck (2005) found that large
rms are more productive and have higher growth rates. However, Bigsten and
Gebreeyesus (2007) nd that small rms in Ethiopia actually grow faster than the
larger ones. In the Indian context, Mazumdar (2009) points out the absence of
the mid size rm in India. He calls the bi modal distribution of employment with
the small and large rms employing more than the mid-sized rm - the missing
middle. He also nds considerable di¤erence in productivity between the small
and large rms the small rms being less productive. He measures size in terms
of employment and productivity in terms of value-added per worker.
As mentioned earlier, most of the above papers measure rm size on the basis
of employment. In India, size of an enterprise is determined on the basis of asset
size. Policies promoting small enterprises are based on this denition of size. It is
therefore pertinent to study the relation between size and performance of rms in
the Indian context with the asset denition of size. In the last chapter, I analyze
the relation between size of rms (dened in terms of assets) and its productivity.
The papers reviewed above have added to the growing knowledge of rm be-
havior and performance especially in the Indian context. The data and literature
on the Indian economy provides tremendous potential for further research in this
area.
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CHAPTER 2
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND EXPORT PARTICIPATION
2.1 Introduction
A rm entering the export market incurs costs for undertaking market research,
market development, distribution channel development and other such activities.
Many of these costs are non-recoverable xed costs. A forward-looking manager
would weigh these sunk costs incurred during market entry, against the future
stream of income. Therefore, entering the export market becomes a question of
which rms have the ability to undertake this investment. A nancially constrained
rm will not be able to undertake this investment, hindering its ability to enter
the export market. A nancially constrained rm will behave as if its discount
rates were higher, which in turn a¤ects its investment allocation. The nancial
constraint could be a result of asymmetrical information, underdeveloped nancial
markets, an unfavorable policy regime, regulated bank lending or corporate tax
structure (Whited, 1992; Fazzari et al, 1988). In this paper, I investigate the
relation between nancial constraints and rmsexport market entry decision for
the manufacturing sector in India for the period 1989-2008.
As discussed in the previous chapter, India underwent both trade and nancial
liberalization in the last two decades. Trade liberalizing policies were undertaken
prior to nancial liberalization. The existence of underdeveloped nancial markets
in such a scenario makes the Indian economy a good candidate to study this re-
lationship between nancial constraints and export participation. The availability
of panel data over a long period of time helps address the issue of persistence in
productivity and export behavior. Having a panel also allows us to address the
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issue of unobserved heterogeneity of rms.
In the literature on export participation, much emphasis has been laid on the
importance of a rms productivity in its export participation decision (Melitz,
2003; Roberts & Tybout, 1997; Bernard, Eaton et al, 2003). According to the
Melitz (2003) model, rms self-select into the export industry if their productivity
is high, as it enables them to undertake the investment associated with new market
entry. The Melitz model describes a plant level decision. If the decision to enter
the export market is a rm level decision, a number of other factors come into
play - one of which is nancial constraints. In this paper, I consider the lack of
availability of nance, which might constrain a rms entry into the export market.
I use the data from the balance sheet and audited nancial statements of In-
dian rms collected by Center for Monitoring Indian Economys (CMIE) in their
Prowess database. The data is an unbalanced panel of manufacturing rms for the
period 1989 to 2008.
The measures of nancial constraint that I consider are liquidity and leverage
ratio of these rms. I use a xed e¤ects estimator, random e¤ect Probit estimator,
and a system General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to estimate the ef-
fect of nancial constraints on export participation while controlling for rm and
industry specic e¤ects. The results suggest strong correlation between nancial
health and export participation decision. I then establish causality better nan-
cial health encourages export participation and not the other way around- using
two estimators. The positive relation between nance and exports does not hold
for the intensive margin of exports (increase in exports of continuing exporters).
All these results support the hypothesis that presence of nancial constraints hin-
ders export market entry. It underscores the importance of having a well-developed
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and smoothly functioning nancial market to the rmsexport participation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the theoretical
background, section 3 discusses the empirical model, section 4 describes the data,
section 5 summarizes the estimation results and specication tests and section 6
is the conclusion.
2.2 Theoretical Background
Theoretical explanation of rm-level export participation got an impetus from
Marc Meltizs seminal work on impact of trade on aggregate industry productivity.
The Melitz model is a heterogeneous rm model. In his model, the xed costs
associated with entry into the export market creates a hysteresis in the industry
with only the more productive rms exporting. The rms that are less productive
cater only to the domestic market and the least productive exit the industry.
One of the assumptions of the model is that all rms, exporters and non-
exporters, cater to the domestic market. Melitz separates each rms prot into
two - prot earned from the domestic market d and prot earned from the export
market x. As the xed production cost f has already been incurred for domestic
production, he accounts for it entirely in the domestic prot. The xed cost of
entry into the export market fx partitions the rms based on their productivity
into exporters and non-exporters.
Melitz builds productivity into the marginal cost of the rms. This, in turn,
a¤ects their protability. Firms that have lower productivity and hence lower
protability will not be able to undertake the xed cost of entry and therefore will
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not enter the export market.
The domestic prot is given by
d = R(!; ; )  f
and
i;d  0 iff !i  ! where R is the variable prots of the rm i which
is a function of its productivity (!), price () and elasticity of demand () of the
product. Only rms that have productivity higher than a particular amount say !,
can remain in the industry. All other rms will not make prots and will be forced
to exit the industry. For a rm to export, its productivity should be higher than
those of the rms that cater to only domestic market. The Melitz model,however,
does not talk about how the export entry cost, fx, is nanced by the rms. The
underlying assumption is that the cost of nancing is negligible and the same for
all the rms.
I introduce here the presence of capital market imperfections as described by
Fazzari et al (1998). The presence of information assymetry, capital market im-
perfections and regulated credit creates a di¤erence in the cost and availability
of credit to rms in the economy. The di¤erence in the cost of capital for rms
implies that the cost of entry into exports could be nanced di¤erently by the
di¤erent rms. The cost of capital will be higher for rms that have less access to
external or internal funds and lower for rms that are cash rich or can raise funds
easily. This nancial heterogeneity in rms will create a partitioning of rms into
exporters and non-exporters irrespective of their productivity.
The prot function for an exporter then is x = R(!; ; )  (f + fx)(1 + ri)
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Here, the xed cost is a function of the rms cost of capital. The cost of capital
ri refers to rm specic cost of capital and not the prevalent market interest rate.
The possibility of making positive prots attracts new rms to the industry. Firms
enter the industry till the last rm entering makes zero prots. As in Melitz (2003),
I refer to this as the zero cuto¤ prot condition where x = 0.
) R(!; ; ) = (fx + f)(1 + ri)
The cuto¤ productivity is given be !^ = R 1((fx + f)(1 + ri); ; )
Only rms with productivity higher than this level of productivity !^ will con-
sider entering the export market. The ability of such rms to enter the export
market, depends on the cost of capital ri. It is this relation that I analyze in my
paper.
The nancial heterogeneity of rms is not just due to capital market imperfec-
tions but also due to a number of features intrinsic to the rms. A rm belonging
to a business group will benet from the institutional infrastructure (be it in the
form of nancial externalities or business reputation and political ties) and will
have access to low cost nance. Similarly, a rm owned by a foreign rm will also
benet from such externalities. Size of the rm too inuences the availability of -
nance, as smaller rms might not have access to credit markets due to information
asymmetries.
A rm belonging to a business group might gain from prior exporting experience
of other rms in that group. Prior exporting experience might signicantly lower
the xed cost of entry into the export market. It is quite possible that a rm
belonging to a business group that has prior experience in exporting will not incur
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any xed cost of entry.2 In the absence of xed cost of entry, there will be no
partitioning of rms based on productivity. In other words, a rm that does not
face xed cost of entry will be able to export even at a lower productivity but
a rm that faces a xed cost of entry will need to be more productive to enter
the export market. It would therefore be possible for rms with varying levels of
productivity to enter the export market.
Given this background, my paper is an empirical investigation of the e¤ect of
nancial constraints on the rms probability of exporting, controlling for produc-
tivity, ownership and size.
2.3 Empirical Model
As the dataset I use is a rich panel of around 6000 rms over a twenty-year period,
it allows me to analyze the rmsexporting behavior over a long period. Even
though I study the rmsexport entry decision in a given year, the persistence in
the exporting behavior can be addressed as the data spans a twenty-year period. It
also allows me to use the lagged values of the nancial health variables in the model
to address issues of any endogeniety in the model. Unlike most other papers, I
control for total factor productivity using three di¤erent measures and nd nancial
health to be an important entry determinant. This result is especially signicant
as it shows that in imperfect capital markets, sunk costs create a hysteresis in the
2Roberts and Tybout (1977) explain the reasons for the presence of entry cost. According
to them, a rm must nd and inform foreign buyers about its product and learn about the
foreign market. It must then research the foreign regulatory environment and then adapt its
product to insure that it conforms to the foreign standards (which include testing, packaging
and labeling requirements). An exporting rm must also set up new distribution channels in the
foreign country and conform to all the shipping rules specied by the foreign customs agency.
The costs mentioned here would be signicantly reduced when another rm in the business group
has already undertaken such activities.
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industry based on nancial constraints and not just productivity.
The export decision depends on the ease with which the rm is able to raise
funds. A rm can choose between internal and external funds to nance its in-
vestment. In the presence of capital market imperfections, internal and external
funds are not perfect substitutes. Firmsinvestment decision in such a scenario
would depend on its nancing decision. Internal funds will have a cost advantage
over new debt or equity nance. Therefore, a low cash ow situation would be
indicative of nancial constraints. Most papers studying nancial constraints on
rmsinvestment behavior use cash ow variables like liquidity, retained earnings,
dividend payout ratio (Fazzari et al 1988; Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991;
Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited, 1995; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1998; Green-
away, Guariglia and Kneller, 2007).
In this paper, I measure nancial constraints using two ratios: leverage and
liquidity. I measure liquidity as the ratio of the di¤erence between current assets
and current liabilities to total assets.3 The higher the liquidity ratio, the better
would be the nancial health of the rm. I measure leverage as the ratio of short-
term debt to current assets.4 Lower the leverage, better the ability of rms to raise
funds for the entry cost. Thus, a rm with more liquidity and lower leverage is in
better nancial health.
The main model is estimated as
yit = Xit + FINit + "t
The dependent variable yit is exports. The independent variables can be
grouped into two - Financial variables (FINit ) and other controls (Xit ).
3Liquidity = (Current Assets-Current Liabilities)/Total Assets
4Leverage = Short term debt/Current Assets
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Financial Variables : As mentioned above, I consider two main nancial vari-
ables, leverage and liquidity. A rms creditworthiness in the debt market and its
reputation as a bankable asset is an important factor in its being able to obtain
nance and establish itself in the export market. In the absence of rmscredit
rating information in the data, I proxy it with the data on commercial paper sold
by the rms. In India, when a rm issues short term debt instruments like deben-
ture and commercial paper it is guaranteed by a commercial bank. In case the rm
defaults, the bank is liable to repay the lenders. A bank guarantees a commercial
paper only after a very careful scrutiny of the rms nancial health. It is also
mandatory for the rms to obtain a specied minimum credit rating from a credit
rating agency to oat a commercial paper. Hence, Commercial paper oated by
a rm is a good measure of its creditworthiness. Bandyopadhyay and Das (2005)
use the issue of commercial paper to measure rm quality and creditworthiness.
Other control variables: It can be argued that a rms investment decision
might be independent of its nancing decision for larger or well connected and/or
more mature rms. Therefore, I control for age, size and ownership type of rms.
I run both the regressions- one with leverage and the other with liquidity- with
controls for ownership (Industrial/Business ownership, Ownership by foreign rms
and Government ownership), TFP, age and the size of the rm. I dene the size
of the rm as the quintiles of asset size within the industry for every year.
Ownership of the rm is a very important determinant of its nancial health.
It could also inuence a rms exporting decision. If the rm belongs to a large
industrial group, it has easier access to not only nance but also other externali-
ties like managerial expertise, experienced leadership, or previous export market
experience. A rm owned by an international rm or by a multinational corpora-
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tion, will also enjoy the aforementioned advantages. Similarly, ownership by the
government will have implications on both the nancial situation and the export
status of a rm. I have therefore controlled for all three kinds of ownership with
dummies. Unobservables like managerial ability could also inuence the exporting
decision. The TFP measure controls for such unobservables. I address this issue
by estimating a xed e¤ects model.
Exact denitions of the various terms used and a note on other data transfor-
mations are given in Annexure A.
2.3.1 Calculation of TFP
I use the Levinsohn-Petrin-Wooldridge method to estimate the Total Factor Pro-
ductivity. Calculating TFP by estimating the production function using Ordinary
Least Square (OLS) poses a simultaneity problem. Productivity dened as the
residual from the Ordinary Least Square will be biased due to the correlation of
input demands with the productivity shocks. To overcome this endogeneity, Olley
& Pakes (1996) developed a model to use investment as a proxy for the produc-
tivity shocks. However, the investment demand function needs to be continuous
and invertible for it to be used as a proxy. This may not be the case if there
are non-convex adjustment costs to capital, making investments lumpy. More im-
portantly, the data on investment is not always available. Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003)(referred to as LP in the rest of the paper) use intermediate inputs as a proxy
instead of investments. Intermediate inputs, like fuel and material, adjust freely
with productivity shocks and there are no adjustment costs attached. Therefore,
the demand curve for intermediate goods will be continuous with no kinks and can
be easily estimated.
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Both these estimators use a two step method to measure productivity. The
two step method used in these estimators is not only complicated but also has a
few drawbacks as discussed by Ackeberg et al (2008). Wooldridge (2009) shows
how two equations using di¤erent instruments in a General Method of Moments
(GMM) set up can be used to overcome these drawbacks. LP (2011) measure
the productivity of Chilean rms with this modied estimator. I employ the same
Wooldridge modication of the LP methodology to estimate the TFP in this paper.
I use one period input lag, contemporary and lagged material as instruments.
The two-step Instrumental Variable GMM (IV-GMM) simultaneously estimates
the labor and capital coe¢ cients and the intercept for each three digit industry.
Following LP (2011), I estimate the productivity of each rm as a residual as given
below.
!i;t = yi;t   (^j + ^ljljt + ^kjkjt)
In the above equation, !i;t is the natural log of productivity of rm i in year
t. yi;t is the natural log of output for year t. ljt is the log of labor, kjt log of
capital stock, and j the intercept and lj and kj the coe¢ cients for each industry
obtained from the IV GMM estimation of the production function. Productivity
! is a function of intermediate input, m and capital, k.
In my paper, output is the Rupee value of output5. The intermediate input
used is the Rupee value of material consumed. Capital stock for rm i in period
t is constructed using the perpetual inventory method as given below:
ki;t = (1  )ki;t 1 + Ii;t
5Output is dened as sales less purchase of nished goods and adjusted for changes in inven-
tory. Input is equal to the sum of material and fuel used. All gures are in Rupees and deated
using the wholesale price index.
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Investment, I in the current period is taken as addition to the capital stock in
the current period a la LP. Depreciation,  is taken at 10 percent for all rms.
2.4 Data Description
The data used is taken from CMIEs Prowess database. CMIE compiles this data
from the audited nancial results of listed and unlisted rms. The rms in Prowess
accounts for almost 75 per cent of all corporate taxes and over 95 per cent of excise
duty collected by the government of India.
The paper uses an unbalanced panel of about 6000 manufacturing rms for
the period 1989 to 2008. All variables are deated by the wholesale price index.
The ow variables have been deated by the annual average Wholesale Price Index
(WPI) deator for the nancial year corresponding to the rm in that year. The
stock variables have been deated by theWPI deator for the corresponding month
in that year. The data does not have information on prices and products. As
nancial statements are drawn for the rm as an entity that might include a
number of plants, the data provides only rm level information and not plant
level.
Since the database does not provide labor information, I infer the amount of
labor by deating the wage bill by average industry wages. The data on wage
per worker has been taken from Central Statistical Organizations (CSO)s Annual
Survey of Industries (ASI) database. The Prowess data has rms from 22 National
Industrial Classication-2 (NIC-2) digit industries. The industries range from food
processing, manufacture of metals, automobiles to electronics and textiles.
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of Real Exports
2.4.1 Summary Statistics
India witnessed a continuous increase in value of exports during the period 1988
to 2008. Figure 3 shows the movement of Indias real exports and the movement
of real exports of the rms in data during that period. I have constructed the
economys exports from International Monetary Funds (IMF) IFS database. The
value of the total Indian exports is represented in Rupees trillion and includes
both exports of goods and services. The value of exports for the rms in the
data includes exports of only goods by the rms included in the dataset and is
represented in Rupees billion. The behavior of exports in both gures is very
similar. It can be seen that the data reects the export pattern of the economy
during the twenty-year period.
Table 2.1 shows mean liquidity, leverage, TFP and proportion of business and
foreign ownership of rms by their export status. Firms have been categorized as
non-exporters, new entrants, continuous exporters and rms exiting exports.6 As
6Firms in the dataset exit and enter the export industry or remain in the export industry for
the total length of years that they exist in the data. I have categorized them as new entrants,
continuous exporters, sporadic exporters, non exporters or exiting rms to analyze their charac-
teristics. A rm is categorized as non exporters for the year t if it does not export in that year
28
Figure 2.2: Liquidity of Firms by Export Status
can be seen, new entrants and continuous exporters enjoy better nancial health
than non-exporters. The TFP of new exporters is also higher than other exporters.
Figure 4 shows the liquidity for non-exporters, new entrants and continuous
exporters. The liquidity of non-exporters is much lower than the new exporters or
continuous exporters.
Large Government owned loss-making businesses, which were eventually sold
o¤, drives the extremely low liquidity. A plot of liquidity without these rms gives
a similar pattern without extreme values as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 6 shows the leverage ratio for non-exporters, new entrants and contin-
uous exporters. Unlike liquidity, no visible pattern can be discerned in the case of
leverage.
t, or the year before, t-1, or the year after, t+1. Similarly continuous exporters are those that
export in all the three period, t-1, t and t+1. A rm entering the export market in year t will
have no exports in the year before but will have exports in the time t+1. I also dene rms
which exit the export market and sporadic exporters on the same basis.
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Figure 2.3: Liquidity of Firms by Export Status (without Outliers)
Figure 2.4: Leverage of Firms by Export Status
2.5 Estimation
There are three main questions that I address in this section. First, I analyze
how nancial constraints impact the extensive margin of trade. Does the presence
of nancial constraints hinder a rms participation in the export market? The
estimation of this extensive margin is addressed in the next sub-section. The
results of the estimation in that sub-section establish the positive relation between
export participation and the nancial health of rms.
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Second, the positive relation between nancial health and exporting decision
leads to the question of causality. It can be argued that exporters enjoy better
nancial health and therefore we observe a positive relation between the two. A
comparison of the nancial health of the rms ex post and ex ante their entry into
the export market addresses this question.
Third, I analyze how the nancial constraints impact the intensive margin of
exports. Does better nancial health imply that exporters will start exporting
more? I nd the evidence inconclusive in answering this question. The absence
of a positive relation between nancial constraints and the intensive margin of
exports conrms the hypothesis that presence of entry cost makes nancial health
an important determinant of export market entry decision.
Finally, I check for robustness by using alternate estimates of TFP and by using
a split sample. I split the sample vertically by size and repeat the estimation.
2.5.1 The Extensive Margin
Since we are analyzing a rms decision to enter the export market, the dependent
variable is a binary variable. The relation to be estimated therefore can be written
as
P (Yit = 1) = Xit + FINit + "t where Yit is the probability that a rm i will
export in year t:
First, to establish that nancial constraints hinder export participation, I esti-
mate the relation between them using xed e¤ects, followed by random e¤ects and
then a system GMM estimator. As the exporting decision is a binary outcome de-
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cision, I then use a probit random e¤ect estimator with a number of specications
to control for various plant level characteristics. To address the issue of endogene-
ity due to the persistence in the dependent variable, I re-estimate this relation
with a system GMM estimator - the Blundell Bond estimator. The following three
sub-sections discuss the estimation results of these empirical models.
Fixed E¤ects Estimates
I start with the Linear Probability model with xed e¤ects as the baseline model
to address the issue of possible correlation between plant characteristics and plant
unobservables. The result of this baseline model is given in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3.
Table 2.2 shows the results of a regression of probability of export participation
on liquidity and Table 2.3 on leverage. The negative coe¢ cient on leverage and
positive coe¢ cient on liquidity conrm the hypothesis that nancial health and
export participation are positively related.
Firms which exported in the previous year are more likely to export in this
period, as they do not face the sunk cost of market entry. To address this, I include
two periods of lagged export status as the dependent variable in all specications.
Including the lags of the export status introduces endogeneity in the estimation. I
address the issue of endogeneity by using a system GMM estimator. As expected,
the lagged export status is strongly related to the probability of exporting in this
period.
I introduce productivity as an additional variable which makes liquidity less
signicant but does not a¤ect leverage. This is not the case in either the ran-
dom e¤ects model or the system GMM where liquidity and productivity remain
signicant in all specications.
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Probit Estimates
As the number of rms is large (6991), an individual rms e¤ect in a particular
year can be assumed to be random. Any other rm level unobservables will be
accounted for in the TFP variable.
The results from the probit estimation are given in Table 2.4 (with liquidity)
and Table 2.5 (with leverage). The results are similar to those from the Linear
Probability estimates. Liquidity is positively and leverage negatively related to the
exporting probability. Lagged export status is again an important determinant of
the current periods export participation probability. As discussed in section 3, we
see that more productive rms are more likely to enter the export market. In the
random e¤ects model, I am able to measure the e¤ect of other rm characteristics
like size, age and ownership.
I introduce size as a regressor in some of the specications. The smallest rms,
the lowest quintile by asset size, comprise the control group. Smaller rms have
a lower probability of exporting compared to larger rms. The inability of small
rms to raise capital probably inuences this result. However, the coe¢ cient on
the interaction of size and the nancial variables does not support this reasoning.
The rms owned by foreign rms, have a higher probability of exporting as
compared to the rest. As discussed earlier, ownership by a foreign rm could
ensure better nancial health. I have again interacted ownership with the nancial
variables. The interaction terms are not important for the export decision except
in the case of a foreign rm with high leverage. Ownership by the Government
with high liquidity is negatively related to export participation.
Creditworthiness is also important for the export decision. Firms that issued
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commercial paper (cp) are more likely to export. In Table 2.4 as well as Table 2.5,
the coe¢ cient on commercial paper is both positive and signicant.
System GMM Estimates
Firms which exported in the previous year are more likely to export in this period,
as they do not face the sunk cost of market entry. Therefore, previous periods
export status will be correlated to the current periods dependent variable the
probability of exporting. This brings in endogeneity in the model, as the errors
are now auto correlated.
A rm that is contemplating entering the export market will start studying the
export market and investing in some xed costs in the period prior to the year of
exports. Its decision will be inuenced by its nancial situation two periods prior
to the year of exports. A two period lag of leverage and liquidity could also a¤ect
the export decision. To address this persistence in both these nancial health
indicators and the dependent variable, I use the system GMM methodology.
BJ refer to their 1995 and 1999 paper where they show that plants undergo dra-
matic contemporaneous changes in their characteristics when their status changes
from exporter to non-exporter and vice-versa. This would give rise to simultaneity
problem. BJ solve this issue by considering one period lag in all plant character-
istics. The data I use is rm level and not plant level data; the question of e¤ect
of export decision on plant characteristics cannot be analyzed here. If such endo-
geneities do exist in my empirical model, the GMM estimation is a good estimator
to account for the same.
I use the system GMM estimator as developed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
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Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The system GMM esti-
mator has the advantage of being able to address the issue of both serial correlation
and any endogenous regressors in the model.
I treat TFP and the nancial variables as predetermined variables. The per-
sistence in both will a¤ect the participation decision.
The estimation results of the GMM system in Table 2.6 reiterate the importance
of export status and the importance of liquidity to the probability of exporting.
I have included two period lags for both the exporting decision variable and the
independent variables. TFP is not important to the exporting decision and in this
dynamic model nor are the other variables that were found to be of importance
in the static model. Liquidity is positively related to export participation and is
signicant. Previous periods liquidity does not inuence the exporting decision.
The coe¢ cient on leverage and one-period lagged leverage, show a negative relation
with the exporting decision. Previous periods leverage has a greater inuence on
the exporting decision.
This result can be better interpreted by understanding how the two measures,
liquidity and leverage, are dened. Liquidity is the ratio of the di¤erence between
current assets and current liabilities to total assets. Total assets do not adjust
frequently, but the numerator, the di¤erence between current assets and current
liabilities, can change frequently to adjust to the needs of the rms. Given the de-
nition of liquidity earlier, the components of liquidity are inventories, receivables,
expenses paid in advance, cash and bank balances, on the current assets side and
short-term debt, account payable, accrued liabilities and other debts on the lia-
bilities side. A rms liquidity changes frequently due to the operational liquidity
from the cash-conversion cycle (i.e. the time it takes to generate revenue from the
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manufacturing process to sale of nal good). Therefore, we see changes in liquidity
in the current period adjust to the needs of the rms including the needs of a new
business requirement - making the current periods liquidity a better indicator of
the availability of cash ow. Leverage on the other hand is the ratio of short-term
debts to current assets. These debts are contractual in nature and could exist for
the entire nancial year. A rm facing nancial constraints would not be able
to adjust spontaneously to their immediate nancial needs by raising short-term
debt. In other words, leverage would be slower to adjust to nancial needs than
liquidity. Therefore, previous periods leverage would be more informative as a
nancial indicator for this periods investment decision.
A rm already exporting would have undertaken the investment in the sunk
cost and therefore would nd it easier to export in the next period as compared to
a new entrant. This can be seen in the coe¢ cient on lagged export status.
2.5.2 Financial Health - Cause or Consequence of Exports
The above results show a positive correlation between the nancial health of rms
and their export participation decision. An interesting question here is whether
nancial health is the cause or the result of export participation.
Though a system GMM addresses this issue by considering lags, I use OLS on
a set of rms to establish the causality more clearly. By isolating new entrants and
continuous exporters in the data, and studying the impact of the nancial health
variables on export participation, we can analyze the e¤ect of export participation
on nancial health.
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The Ex Ante Analysis
Isolating rms that did not export for two consecutive periods, helps analyze if ex
ante nancial health is important for export participation. The rms in this set did
or did not export in period t+1 but had not exported in period t and t-1. Therefore,
we have either new entrants or non-exporters in this set. The ex ante analysis
estimation is given in column 1 and 2 of Table 2.7. The dependent variables here
are the nancial health variables. Leverage is negatively related to the probability
of exporting in the future. Lower the leverage, higher the probability of entering
the export market. Lagged leverage and ownership by an industrial group, foreign
private group and the government increases the leverage. Similarly, liquidity is
positively related to the probability of export participation in the next period.
Using lagged dependent variable as a regressor could also lead to biased es-
timates of the coe¢ cients. I have therefore used the GMM system estimator to
verify the results. The GMM estimator shows coe¢ cients not signicantly di¤erent
from zero. (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.8).
The Ex Post Analysis
In this analysis, I retain only new exporters and continuous exporters in the data.
I compare the nancial health of continuous exporters to that of the new exporters
to see if exporting for over two years improves the nancial health of the rms. In-
terestingly, the nancial health, leverage and liquidity of rms worsen with exports.
The estimation results can be seen in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.7. Though the
OLS estimation shows strong negative relation between nancial health and con-
tinuous exporter status, the GMM estimation does not corroborate this hypothesis
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(Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.8).
The estimation does not unequivocally support the hypothesis that export par-
ticipation improves nancial health. The OLS estimation shows nancial health
to be the cause and not the e¤ect of export participation.
2.5.3 Intensive Margin
The presence of sunk costs makes nancial health very important for the export
participation decision of the rm. As a next step, I test to see if the nancial
health of the rms has an impact on their ability to export more than before, that
is, the intensive margin. Table 2.9 shows the estimation results of an ordinary least
square regression of amount of exports of continuous exporters on their nancial
health and other variables. As can be seen, only lagged export status increases the
intensive margin.
I verify the above results by using the change in the amount of exports as the
dependent variable. There is no signicant change in the estimation result. The
nancial health variables do not inuence the amount of exports by an exporting
rm.
2.5.4 Robustness Check
As a robustness check, I split the data vertically by size. There are ve categories
of size. I club the smaller three (very small, small and medium) in the rst group
and the larger two in the second group. Table 2.10 shows the estimation results for
both groups with leverage and liquidity. Though the rms could have been split
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by other variables as well, size is an especially important one as it can impact both
the TFP and the nancial variables. The results are in line with the regression
results on the whole data. Productivity, lagged export status and liquidity impact
the exporting decision. Leverage does not remain an important determinant of
export participation anymore. Ownership by foreign rm continues to be a a
factor inuencing export participation and government ownership in once again
negatively related. Commercial paper is a signicant variable for bigger rms.
Further, I also use the measure of TFP as the residual from the production
function measured using OLS in the estimation of the main model (Table 2.11).
The results once again conrms our hypothesis that nancial health is directly
related to the exporting decision.
2.6 Conclusion
The estimation results show signicant correlation between leverage and liquidity
of the rm with the probability of exporting. This establishes the positive relation
between nancial health and export participation.
I also show that the ex ante nancial health is positively related to the prob-
ability of exports where as the ex post nancial health is not. This shows that
the rms entering the export market are nancially healthier than non-exporters;
thereby, establishing causality from nancial health to export participation. A re-
gression of nancial health variables on amount of exports of continuous exporters
is negative with the OLS estimator and inconclusive with the GMM. This result
shows that the intensive margin of exports does not improve with better nancial
health.
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The above results validate the hypothesis that nancial constraints will inhibit
a rm from entering the export market. The estimation results imply that any
export promotion policy by the government would have to address the issue of
credit constraint to be e¤ective.
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Table 2.1: Mean of Key Statistics by Export Status
Leverage Liquidity TFP Indl. Grp. Ownership Foreign Firm Ownership
Non Exporters 0.023 0.068 0.015 0.281 0.023
New Exporters 0.023 0.155 0.273 0.365 0.053
Continuous Exporters 0.027 0.156 0.203 0.465 0.093
Exiting Exporters 0.036 0.076 0.0001 0.396 0.04
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Table 2.2: Fixed E¤ects Linear Probability with Liquidity as the Financial Health
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Dependent Variable Export Dummy
Productivity 0.0402*** 0.0357*** 0.0418
[0.00473] [0.00492] [0.00539]
Lagged Export Status (1 pd.) 0.374*** 0.376*** 0.372*** 0.370***
[0.0109] [0.0108] [0.0108] [0.0109]
Lagged Export Status (2 pds) 0.0802*** 0.0766*** 0.0795*** 0.0765***
[0.00919] [0.00915] [0.00918] [0.00927]
Liquidity 0.0431*** 0.0305** 0.0320**
[0.0164] [0.0134] [0.0139]
Constant 0.356*** 0.356*** 0.354*** 0.309***
[0.00712] [0.00716] [0.00715] [0.0117]
Observations 31,752 32,218 31,752 31,752
R-squared 0.184 0.183 0.185 0.188
Number of rms 4,178 4,232 4,178 4,178
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This is a panel linear regression of export participation dummy on liquid-
ity, tfp, and other variables. The dependent variable is the export participation
indicator in year t. It equals 1 if the rm exported in year t and 0 if not. Col. 4
includes industry and year xed e¤ects.
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Table 2.3: Fixed E¤ects Linear Probability with Leverage as the Financial Health
Variable
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Dependent Variable Export Dummy
Productivity 0.0398*** 0.0456***
[0.00473] [0.00525]
Lagged Export Status (1 pd.) 0.377*** 0.373*** 0.371***
[0.0110] [0.0109] [0.0109]
Lagged Export Status (2 pd.) 0.0767*** 0.0801*** 0.0773***
[0.00921] [0.00919] [0.00928]
Leverage -0.0427*** -0.0352** -0.0342**
[0.0146] [0.0141] [0.0143]
Constant 0.362*** 0.357*** 0.312***
[0.00717] [0.00714] [0.0117]
Observations 31,782 31,752 31,752
R-squared 0.180 0.185 0.187
Number of rms 4,180 4,178 4,178
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This is a panel linear regression of export participation dummy on leverage,
tfp and other variables. The dependent variable is the export participation indica-
tor in year t. It equals 1 if the rm exported in year t and 0 if not. Col. 3 includes
ind and year xed e¤ects.
43
Table 2.4: Random E¤ects Probit Estimation with Liquidity as the Financial
Health Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Dependent Variable Export Dummy
Small 0.102*** 0.101***
[0.0292] [0.0292]
Medium 0.223*** 0.223***
[0.0330] [0.0331]
Large 0.302*** 0.301***
[0.0391] [0.0392]
Very Large 0.430*** 0.431***
[0.0482] [0.0483]
Productivity 0.180*** 0.164*** 0.145*** 0.137*** 0.133***
[0.0126] [0.0129] [0.0133] [0.0137] [0.0143]
Liquidity 0.197*** 0.141*** 0.137*** 0.145*** 0.278***
[0.0214] [0.0221] [0.0223] [0.0228] [0.0654]
Export Status (1 lag) 1.959*** 1.964*** 1.956*** 1.936*** 1.889*** 1.887***
[0.0268] [0.0265] [0.0268] [0.0271] [0.0287] [0.0287]
Export Status (2 lag) 0.982*** 0.965*** 0.982*** 0.983*** 0.927*** 0.926***
[0.0268] [0.0265] [0.0269] [0.0273] [0.0278] [0.0278]
Owner Indl. Grp. 0.0478* 0.0739***
[0.0258] [0.0274]
Owner For. Pvt 0.371*** 0.346***
[0.0566] [0.0832]
Owner Govt -0.286*** -0.265***
[0.0610] [0.0614]
Commercial Paper 0.516*** 0.521***
[0.125] [0.125]
For. OwnerxLiquidity 0.156
[0.428]
Indl. Owner x Liquidity -0.206***
[0.0654]
TFP x Liquidity -0.0598*
[0.0310]
Govt Owner x Liquidity -0.199***
[0.0765]
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This is a panel probit regression of export participation dummy on leverage,
productivity, ownership and other variables. The dependent variable is the export
participation indicator in year t. It equals 1 if the rm exported in year t and 0 if
not. Col. 1 to 3 do not include ind and year xed e¤ects.
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Table 2.5: Random E¤ects Probit Estimation with Leverage as the Financial
Health Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Dependent Variable Export Dummy
Small 0.101*** 0.0986*** 0.102***
[0.0290] [0.0290] [0.0292]
Medium 0.216*** 0.214*** 0.225***
[0.0328] [0.0328] [0.0331]
Large 0.296*** 0.295*** 0.304***
[0.0388] [0.0389] [0.0392]
Very Large 0.425*** 0.419*** 0.434***
[0.0479] [0.0480] [0.0483]
Productivity 0.179*** 0.161*** 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.136***
[0.0126] [0.0130] [0.0134] [0.0136] [0.0137]
Leverage -0.172** -0.112 -0.119* -0.182** -0.135 -0.135*
[0.0720] [0.0698] [0.0703] [0.0749] [0.137] [0.0759]
Export Status (1 lag) 1.973*** 1.960*** 1.939*** 1.896*** 1.895*** 1.889***
[0.0267] [0.0268] [0.0271] [0.0286] [0.0286] [0.0287]
Export Status (2 lag) 0.965*** 0.983*** 0.985*** 0.930*** 0.931*** 0.927***
[0.0267] [0.0268] [0.0272] [0.0277] [0.0277] [0.0278]
Owner Industrial Grp. 0.0418 0.0401 0.0492*
[0.0256] [0.0259] [0.0258]
Owner Foreign Private 0.373*** 0.419*** 0.373***
[0.0564] [0.0599] [0.0567]
Owner Government -0.305*** -0.326*** -0.283***
[0.0604] [0.0619] [0.0610]
Commercial Paper 0.523*** 0.522*** 0.517***
[0.125] [0.125] [0.125]
Foreign OwnerxLeverage -1.167**
[0.492]
Indl. Owner x Leverage 0.0369
[0.167]
TFP x Leverage 0.109
[0.113]
Govt Owner x Leverage 0.491
[0.315]
Note: This is a panel probit regression of export participation dummy on leverage,
tfp, ownership and other variables. The dependent variable is the export partici-
pation indicator in year t. It equals 1 if the rm exported in year t and 0 if not.
Col. 1 and 2 do not include ind and year xed e¤ects. Col. 6 shows specication
with both leverage and liquidity in the same equation.
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Table 2.6: System GMM Estimation
(1) (2)
Variables Export Dummy Export Dummy
Small 0.349** -0.291*
[0.154] [0.165]
Medium 0.0411 -0.420**
[0.146] [0.205]
Very Large 0.638***
[0.206]
Lagged Export Status (1 pd.) 0.387*** 0.397***
[0.00778] [0.00774]
Productivity -0.00537 0.00191
[0.00786] [0.00745]
Leverage -0.0191*
[0.0101]
Lagged Leverage (1 pd) -0.0442***
[0.0123]
Liquidity 0.0406***
[0.00727]
Lagged Liquidity (1 pd) 0.00227
[0.00734]
Ownership by Industrial Grp. 0.303*** 0.199***
[0.0591] [0.0634]
Ownership by Foreign Pvt. 0.0207 -0.0259
[0.212] [0.220]
Ownership by Govt. 0.167 0.00772
[0.243] [0.191]
Commercial Paper 0.0155 0.0166
[0.0153] [0.0154]
Age at time t 1.49e-06 -0.000217
[0.000168] [0.000169]
Constant 0.158 0.623***
[0.154] [0.173]
Number of Observations 38,692 38,692
Number of Firms 5,300 5,301
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Financial Health Ex Ante and Ex Post Export Participation (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Leverage Liquidity Leverage Liquidity
Ex Ante Ex Post
Leverage (1pd) 0.521*** 0.641***
[0.00491] [0.00487]
Export Participation (1 pd forward) -0.00551*** 0.00743***
[0.00174] [0.00251]
Size 0.00298*** 0.00120 0.00179*** 0.00260***
[0.000644] [0.000932] [0.000623] [0.000873]
Industrial Group Ownership 0.00668*** -0.00651** 0.00526*** -0.0101***
[0.00178] [0.00257] [0.00176] [0.00247]
Ownership Foreign Private 0.00693** -0.00185 0.00379 -0.00308
[0.00319] [0.00463] [0.00322] [0.00453]
Ownership Government 0.0159*** -0.0350*** 0.0107*** -0.0413***
[0.00409] [0.00595] [0.00400] [0.00565]
Age at time t -4.94e-06 2.28e-06 -8.83e-07 4.77e-06
[6.13e-06] [8.92e-06] [4.41e-06] [6.22e-06]
Liquidity (1pd lag) 0.993*** 0.966***
[0.00238] [0.00218]
Continuous or New Exporter Dummy 0.00350** -0.00804***
[0.00141] [0.00198]
Constant -0.000268 0.00674 -0.00595 0.0265***
[0.00484] [0.00701] [0.00572] [0.00804]
Number of Observations 31,359 31,801 38,718 39,248
R-squared 0.272 0.852 0.315 0.840
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note:Ex ante analysis done on rms which do not export in period t-1 and t but might export
in period t+1. Ex post analysis done on rms which are either new or continuous exporters. For
Col. 1 and 2, leverage and liquidity are regressed on lagged leverage and liquidity, and on the
probability of exporting in the next period. In col. 3 and 4, leverage and liquidity are regressed
on lagged leverage and liquidity and on their export status as a new exporter or a continuous
exporter.
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Table 2.8: Financial Health Ex Ante Ex Post (system GMM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Leverage Liquidity Leverage Liquidity
Ex Ante Ex Post
Leverage (1pd) 0.209*** 0.0295***
[0.00723] [0.00548]
Export Participation (1 pd forward) -0.00457 0.00454
[0.00384] [0.00498]
Size -0.00369 0.0152*** -0.00430* 0.0229***
[0.00281] [0.00364] [0.00241] [0.00364]
Industrial Group Ownership -4.724*** -0.225 -0.146*** -0.247***
[0.205] [0.154] [0.0378] [0.0465]
Ownership Foreign Private -0.192 10.60*** 1.825*** -0.983***
[0.244] [0.548] [0.127] [0.209]
Ownership Government 0.972*** -7.078*** 2.995*** -1.965***
[0.231] [0.342] [0.127] [0.155]
Age at time t 0.00674*** 0.00145*** 0.000584*** 0.00161***
[0.000593] [0.000532] [0.000126] [0.000165]
Liquidity (1pd lag) 0.640*** 0.819***
[0.00674] [0.00536]
Continuous or New Exporter Dummy -0.0109*** -0.00454
[0.00213] [0.00321]
Constant 2.144*** 2.164*** -0.396*** 1.174***
[0.314] [0.173] [0.0759] [0.0978]
Number of Observations 31,359 31,801 38,718 39,248
R-squared 3765 3817 5301 5364
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Ex ante analysis done on rms which do not export in period t-1 and t but might export
in period t+1. Ex post analysis done on rms which are either new or continuous exporters. For
Col. 1 and 2, leverage and liquidity are regressed on lagged leverage and liquidity, and on the
probability of exporting in the next period. In col. 3 and 4, leverage and liquidity are regressed
on lagged leverage and liquidity and on their export status as a new exporter or a continuous
exporter.
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Table 2.9: OLS Estimation of Intensive Margin of Exports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Exports Exports Change in Exports Change in Exports
Productivity -9.765e+06 -9.405e+06 0.317 0.307
[9.442e+06] [9.498e+06] [0.257] [0.258]
Lagged Export Status (1 pd) 1.325*** 1.325***
[0.00224] [0.00224]
Leverage 4.459e+06 1.547
[7.768e+07] [2.112]
Lagged Leverage (1 pd) -3.039e+07 -0.0631
[9.565e+07] [2.601]
Liquidity 6.121e+07 0.0436
[5.630e+07] [1.531]
Lagged Liquidity (1 pd) -7.497e+07 -0.289
[6.451e+07] [1.754]
Ownership by Indl. Group 425,333 -199,285 0.302 0.303
[1.499e+07] [1.502e+07] [0.408] [0.409]
Ownership by Foreign Pvt. -4.626e+06 -5.237e+06 -0.525 -0.525
[2.293e+07] [2.294e+07] [0.623] [0.624]
Ownership by Government -2.335e+08*** -2.370e+08*** 2.414** 2.443**
[3.945e+07] [3.949e+07] [1.072] [1.073]
Commercial Paper 2.995e+06 2.794e+06 -0.672 -0.640
[3.348e+07] [3.344e+07] [0.910] [0.909]
Age at time t -12,042 -12,584 0.000392 0.000379
[46,444] [46,182] [0.00126] [0.00126]
Constant 4.417e+07 5.145e+06 4.962*** 5.034***
[5.002e+07] [4.898e+07] [1.328] [1.332]
Number of Observations 19,453 19,453 19,453 19,453
Number of rms 2,693 2,694 2,693 2,694
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Col. 1 and 2 is the regression of total exports of the continuous exporters
on TFP, ownership and the nancial health variables -leverage and liquidity re-
spectively. Col. 3 and 4 is the regression of the change in exports on the same
independent variables. Change in exports is dened as the ratio of the increase
in exports in one year to previous periods exports. Year and industry dummies
included in all the specications.
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Table 2.10: Probit Estimates with Vertical Split of Data by Size of Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Export Dummy Export Dummy Export Dummy Export Dummy
Small -0.136 -0.167 -0.147** -0.151**
[0.108] [0.110] [0.0676] [0.0677]
Medium -0.123 -0.146 -0.0647 -0.0699
[0.111] [0.113] [0.0563] [0.0564]
Productivity 0.116*** 0.104*** 0.191*** 0.168***
[0.0164] [0.0168] [0.0301] [0.0306]
Leverage -0.153 -0.167
[0.0952] [0.123]
Liquidity 0.108*** 0.240***
[0.0264] [0.0605]
Lagged Export Status (1 pd) 1.854*** 1.851*** 1.930*** 1.925***
[0.0351] [0.0352] [0.0533] [0.0534]
Lagged Export Status (2 pd) 0.912*** 0.910*** 0.907*** 0.905***
[0.0357] [0.0357] [0.0520] [0.0520]
Ownership by Industrial Group -0.0274 -0.0218 0.0233 0.0291
[0.0337] [0.0338] [0.0524] [0.0525]
Ownership by Foreign Private 0.278*** 0.275*** 0.513*** 0.512***
[0.0775] [0.0775] [0.106] [0.106]
Ownership by Government -0.386*** -0.366*** -0.256*** -0.235**
[0.116] [0.117] [0.0913] [0.0915]
Commercial Paper 1.020 1.012 0.503*** 0.495***
[0.806] [0.806] [0.137] [0.137]
Constant -1.041*** -1.306*** -1.332*** -1.378***
[0.139] [0.145] [0.123] [0.123]
Number of Observations 15,748 15,748 13,343 13,343
Number of Firms 3,053 3,053 1,587 1,587
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Col. 1 and 2 refer to the estimates on the rst group containing rms which
are very small, small and medium. Col. 3 and 4 give the estimates for the second
group containing rms which are large and very large. Medium and large rms are
the control variables in the two groups respectively. Year and industry dummies
and age are included. Export dummy takes unit value if the rm exported that
year and zero otherwise.
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Table 2.11: Random E¤ects Probit Using Productivity Measured as OLS
(1) (2)
Variables Export Dummy Export Dummy
Small 0.0667** 0.0716**
[0.0291] [0.0293]
Medium 0.165*** 0.179***
[0.0330] [0.0334]
Large 0.224*** 0.239***
[0.0389] [0.0394]
Very Large 0.306*** 0.326***
[0.0487] [0.0494]
Productivity 0.150*** 0.133***
(Panel Reg. Ui error) [0.0158] [0.0161]
Lagged Export Status (1 pd.) 1.895*** 1.888***
[0.0286] [0.0287]
Lagged Export Status (2 pd.) 0.919*** 0.917***
[0.0276] [0.0277]
Leverage -0.213***
[0.0765]
Liquidity 0.160***
[0.0228]
Ownership by Industrial Grp. 0.0288 0.0368
[0.0253] [0.0256]
Ownership by Foreign Pvt. 0.358*** 0.357***
[0.0562] [0.0565]
Ownership by Govt. -0.320*** -0.298***
[0.0602] [0.0610]
Commercial Paper 0.519*** 0.513***
[0.125] [0.126]
Age at time t -6.33e-05 -6.27e-05
[8.25e-05] [8.29e-05]
Constant -1.403*** -1.596***
[0.0685] [0.0734]
Number of Observations 31,752 31,751
Number of Firms 4,178 4,178
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER 3
PRODUCTIVITY AND FIRM SIZE - EVIDENCE FROM INDIA
3.1 Introduction1
Should governments in developing countries protect and promote small rms?
Smaller rms su¤er from scale disadvantages, lower access to credit and neces-
sary political clouts to inuence policy (Tybout, 2000). At the same time, there is
evidence that smaller rms generate more patents per capita, and have more exi-
ble management style and agility to adapt to technology changes (Dhawan, 2001).
Economic policies around the developing world o¤er incentives and protections to
rms under certain threshold sizes. However, e¤ects of such policies on aggregate
productivity cannot be known unless we know if smaller rms are more productive
than their larger counterparts, so that, an industry characterized by many small
rms is more productive in aggregate than the one dominated by a few large rms.
Using a large panel of Indian rms that report balance sheet information, we
estimate and compare total factor productivities for large and small rms for the
1994-2008 period. Total factor productivity, or the amount of output that is not
explained by the amounts of inputs, has been identied as a key variable in ex-
plaining the heterogeneous growth performances of developing countries (Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999)). We perform the follow-
ing exercise we divide rms in an industry into ve asset quintiles and examine
if rms in the lowest quintile, the smallest ones, are more productive than their
larger counterparts. We have dened size in terms of asset holdings of a rm and
not in terms of employment, a more common measure in the context of developing
1Co-authored with Prabal De, City College of New York
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countries. We use asset size because of lack of employee data and the fact that the
o¢ cial denition of rm size in India is asset-based and not employment-based.
We nd that smaller rms, particularly rms in the lowest asset percentile, are
more productive than the rest. This result is robust to a variety of alternative
denitions of size and productivity such as using a di¤erent estimation method for
TFP, using all ve asset classes instead of two, and using a continuous measure of
size such as market share.
A second key nding is that productivity is dependent both on healthy cash
ow and the propensity to invest in research and development; smaller rms that
invest in research and development and have a healthy cash ow are more produc-
tive. This conrms the theoretical assertion later that smaller rms can be more
productive if they can leverage their advantage of having exible management and
overcome liquidity constraints.
Identication is based on a combination of strategies. First, we show that there
is little inter-asset-size mobility for rms in India in the sense that only a handful of
rms in the lowest quintile have moved to upper quintiles in the post-reform period.
This phenomenon is not limited in our data, it is present in Indian manufacturing
in general. Therefore, it is unlikely that a rms current or past productivity would
a¤ect its size. Second, we use industry and year xed e¤ects to purge our estimates
of confounding time-invariant unobservable variables at various levels.
There are several reasons why a rms size may be instrumental in explain-
ing its performance. Intuitively, there is a trade-o¤ between growing bigger and
gaining productivity. While small rms have the advantage of smaller and more
exible management and lower response time to market changes, larger rms can
reap the benets of economies of scale, particularly in some industries like the au-
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tomobile industry. Larger rms also wield political clout and garner better access
to government credits, contracts and licenses. This is especially true for developing
countries. Even private nancial institutions are likely to favor big rms for the
latters better liquidity and more stable operations.
Size-productivity relationship at the micro level has implications for overall
industry productivity as well, particularly in the background of a variety of policies
that often focus on threshold size. If small rms are more productive, these policy
incentives are likely to enhance overall productivity in the relevant industry. The
puzzle here is that small productive rms do not seem to grow enough, and fast
enough, to use claim more resources. Though the issue if life-cycle growth of rms
is beyond the scope of this paper, it has been recently shown elsewhere (Hseih
and Klenow (2012)) that older and more mature Indian rms do not grow in size
reducing the aggregate productivity of the Indian economy.
Finally, this polemic has become particularly important in the last decade or so
for two more reasons. A number of economies including India have liberalized their
trade and licensing regimes to allow easy entry of rms and to reduce monopolies
of either big state enterprises, or big private rms. Second, much richer micro-
datasets are increasingly available to empirically assess the dynamic changes in
productivity2.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the
characteristics and brief history of small scale industries in India. The section
after that we discusses data with some of the details being relegated to the Appen-
2Though it is more usual to estimate productivity at the plant level, rm-level productivity
is more appropriate in our context as size-restriction is imposed at the rm-level and not the
plant-level. Admittedly, they are not identical as a rm may have several plants and as Winter
(1999) shows rm nancials may a¤ect plant productivity. Using balance sheet data is a more
modern trend, partly because of availability of such database. One example is Khandelwal and
Topalova (2010),who use the same database to estimate TFP.
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dices. The remaining sections are devoted to empirical specication, estimation
and discussion of results along with some major caveats. We conclude with a brief
discussion of the policy implications of our ndings.
3.2 Background: Small Enterprises in India
Small and medium enterprises play an important role in economic growth by con-
tributing to the GDP (Beck et al, 2005). In India, classication of rms by size
is based on a rms asset size (unlike in the US and EU where it depends on em-
ployment). According to the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development
Act, 2006 of the Government of India, micro, small and medium enterprises are
dened as the production units where the investment in plant and machinery does
not exceed 2.5 million rupees, 50 million rupees and 100 million rupees respectively
($1 = 55 INR approximately). This is subject to the condition that the unit is not
owned, controlled or a subsidiary of any other undertaking. A set of small rms do
not report their balance sheets and hence become part of the unorganized sector
in o¢ cial classication. These rms are not included in our study as the balance
sheet-based database we use does not capture them3.
Among the Asian countries, India has been unique in terms of its focus on the
development of small and medium enterprises since independence. Post-independence,
the avowed industrial development strategy in India was to set up the core capital-
intensive infrastructure industries accompanied by a number of small-scale labor
intensive consumer goods manufacturers. These small rms were to be spread
3The unorganized sector accounts for about 45 percent of the employment in the manufactur-
ing sector and contributes to about 44 percent of the GDP as estimated by the Central Statistical
Organisation, India. The data we use does include rms which are not publicly traded. A detail
discussion of the informal manufacturing sector in India is beyond the scope of this paper.
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across the nation in rural and urban locations, which would not only increase
employment opportunities but also help in industrial dispersal.
By 2003-2004, the Small Scale Industry (SSI) units accounted for more than
40 percent of gross value of output in manufacturing sector and about 34 percent
of total exports. It is the highest employment-providing sector after agricultural
sector. Though 87 percent of the SSI units are unregistered, the registered units
account for 72 percent of the total SSI production and 87 percent of total SSI
exports4.
However, in spite of the policy rhetoric and 40 percent contribution to gross
value of output, small enterprises have been plagued by inadequate working capi-
tal, delay in sanction of working capital, poor and obsolete technology, inadequate
demand and other marketing problems and infrastructural constraints among oth-
ers. With liberalization, small rms have not only been facing the challenges of
increased competition but have been further disadvantaged by the credit squeeze.
With the increase in foreign direct investment and portfolio investment, the central
bank tries to sterilize their impact and hold on to the monetary targets. This leads
to a credit squeeze, which is distributed unevenly in the economy, with the small
rms feeling the credit constraint more5.
3.3 Data
The data used in this research has also been obtained from the Centre for Mon-
itoring Indian Economy (henceforth, CMIE)s PROWESS database. We use an
4Source: Development Commission (SSI), Third Census, Government of India
5Morris and Basant (2006) present a detailed discussion of the nancial constraints faced by
small rms in India.
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unbalanced panel data of manufacturing rms for the period 1994 to 2008. The
choice of time period has been dictated by the intention to keep the most recent
data and avoid having a sample including years containing too few rms. The
number of rms covered in the PROWESS database has jumped steeply in 1994
and remained within the band of 10% more or less until 2008.
We use one more source of data for robustness checks. There is some evidence
that large rms pay higher wage6. If this is systematically the case, then our
calculation of labor is biased, as we use an industry-wide deator. This will under-
estimate the TFP of larger rms a¤ecting our regression results. Since rm-level
wage data is missing for a large majority of rms, we cannot deal with this directly
as it will lead to a drastic loss of sample size. Therefore, we deal with this in a cou-
ple of indirect ways. First, we see if, given the limited data, there is any evidence
that large rms systematically pay more. We next look at a roughly comparable
database on Indian manufacturing sector the Annual Survey of Industries and es-
timate the average wage premium between small and large rms7. The average
wage rate of rms in the fth quintile is approximately three times of that in the
rst quintile. That is, large rms pay almost three times the wage an average small
rm pays. We recalibrate our wages to account for this wage premium and then
recalculate labor and TFP8. On estimating our various specications, we nd that
the small rms still have signicantly higher TFP than the larger rms; though
the coe¢ cients become smaller.
We are unable to identify the rms o¢ cially registered as small enterprises in
6Brown and Medo¤ (1989) analyze six reasons for wage premium paid by large rms and
nd that better quality of labor force explains only some of this wage premium and a signicant
amount of wage premium remains unexplained. Idson and Oi (1999) nd this wage premium
exists for US rms. They explain this in terms of better productivity of these rms.
7We thank Gunjan Sharma for providing us this data. Please see Chamarbagwala & Sharma
(2011).
8The details of this estimation are available upon request.
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our data. If we use the denition of small enterprises as dened by the MMSME,
about 36 percent of the data would be the size of a small enterprise, and 29 percent
of the data would qualify to be small enterprises not belonging to a big industrial
group (which is one of the other conditions for belonging to the small industries
sector). We discuss the main variable of our interest size of the rms in detail
here, relegating the detail discussion of the construction of the other variables to
Appendix 1.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Specication
We have the following testable hypotheses: 1. Ceteris paribus, small rms, ap-
propriately dened, are more productive than their larger counterparts (i.e. after
controlling for alternative explanations such as ownership, age, research and devel-
opment). 2. Size-productivity relationship transmits through other variables such
as R&D and availability of liquidity in the form of cash and bank balances.
In order to estimate the e¤ects of a rms size on its productivity, we start with
the following reduced form baseline specication (equation 1):
TFPijt = 0+sSMALLijt+mimportsijt+xexportsijt+rrndijt+oOwnershipijt+
bBusinessHouseijt+ageit+agesqit+i+j+t+ijt ......................................(1)
The dependent variable is the Total Factor Productivity of a rm i, in industry
j and period t. SMALL is an indicator of the size of the rm by assets within the
industry it belongs to. For each industry and year, rms have been categorized
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into ve quintiles according to their asset sizes. The size variable is therefore
comparable across industries and across years. The indicator small here refers to
the lowest quintile in the industry, that is, the lowest twenty percent of the rms
by asset size. s is our coe¢ cient of interest.
The calculation of total factor productivity using the traditional method of
Ordinary Least Square may su¤er from simultaneity bias. For example, with a
positive shock to productivity, the use of inputs also increases. The residual will
therefore be a biased estimate of productivity.
To overcome this simultaneity issue, Levinsohn and Petrin (2007) use inter-
mediate inputs as instruments to control for the correlation between input levels
and unobserved productivity shocks. Conditional on capital, prot-maximizing
behavior leads more productive rms to use more intermediate inputs. We use the
Levinsohn- Petrin estimation as the main measure of TFP in this paper.
Wooldridge (2009) shows how proxy variables used for controlling unobserved
productivity can be implemented by using the generalized method of moments
estimation9. We use Wooldridges modication of the Levinsohn-Petrin method
as another measure for TFP for our robustness check. The rest of the control
variables in equation (1) have been chosen to ameliorate the omitted variable bias.
The choice of variables is driven mostly by either previous literature or theoretical
prediction. A rm importing from other countries is likely to gain in terms of
productivity. This gain can be in terms of quality embodied in the imported goods
or by the learning-by-doing phenomenon. Moreover, this gain in productivity
would be more pronounced if the rm imports intermediate goods or capital goods.
The imports variable is dened as total imports as a percentage of sales. Total
9Please refer to Van Beveren (2010) for a detailed discussion on the various measures of TFP.
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imports include imports of raw material, nished goods, spares and capital goods.
To be able to export, a rm needs to invest in developing a product that not
only caters to the international market but is also better than those produced by
other rms world-wide. This encourages the rm to invest in product development
activities and improve the quality of the product or improve the production process.
Both Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003) explain the phenomenon of how
exporting rms are more productive than the non-exporting ones. Exports are
also expressed as percentage of sales in our estimation.
Being part of a business group has important externalities for a rm. Loosely
dened, a business group or business house is a conglomerate with a number of
nominally independent rms under its umbrella such that the rms have unique
identities but operate under a common administrative or nancial management.
Most of these business houses are family -owned. Business houses provide institu-
tional infrastructure to the rms under its umbrella. The advantages of belonging
to a business house ranges from being able to get low cost internal funds to busi-
ness reputation and government ties. The concentrated ownership could provide
long- term perspective on R&D investment (Claessens et al, 2000). It is therefore
reasonable to assume that ownership by a business house could inuence a rms
productivity. The business- house ownership variable is an indicator variable that
takes unit value if the rm belongs to a business house and zero otherwise.
Type of ownership (government, foreign, private) can also have important im-
plications for productivity. This is particularly true for India between 1994 and
2008 as various economic reform measures and its e¤ects were spreading across
industries. While privatization shifted ownership from government to private en-
tities, liberalization of foreign investment regime implied greater ownership by
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foreign rms. There is a body of work on the e¤ects of ownership both govern-
ment vs. private and domestic vs. foreign. In what follows, we will estimate a
variety of this baseline specication.
3.4.2 Relationship Between Size, Productivity and Firm
Capabilities
There is a body of research on the link between rm size and the various aspects
of research and development. Firm size has been linked either to the investment in
R&D (in terms of patent-to-expenditure ratio (Acs and Audertesch, 1990; Bound
et al., 1982; Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Hausman et al., 1984; Kim et al, 2010;
Syrneonidis 1996) or to the magnitude of investment (Acs and Audertesch, 1987,
Bound et al., 1984; Scherer, 1986). A natural extension to this literature is to
examine if size-productivity relationship is mediated by R&D expenditure of a
rm10.
Apart from R&D, other rm capabilities, such as human capital and technologi-
cal gap and development expenditure industry play important roles in productivity
determination (Blalock and Gertler, 2009). We focus on a variable that is partic-
ularly relevant in the context of developing countries like India. We test a rms
cash ow proxying for liquidity, as a predictor of productivity. This strategy is
motivated by the dual recent evidence that rms are credit-constrained, and that
credit constraint inuences rm performance and investment decisions (Nagaraj,
2011). In an environment characterized by imperfect credit markets, small rms
10For brevity, we forego a fuller discussion of the size-R&D literature here. Please see Henderson
(1993) for an early exposition and Shefer and Frenkel (2005) and Kim (2009) for a summary of
empirical research.
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su¤er from liquidity constraints because of the lack of political clout and economic
collateral that they can o¤er. Cash ow has been dened as cash in hand (including
bank balance) as a proportion of the rm size measured by total assets. We esti-
mate a modied equation (1) that includes cash ow, R&D and their interaction
with size respectively.
3.5 Identication
Equation (1) captures the relationship between (small) size and total productivity.
For identication of the causal e¤ect of smallness, we rely on the random e¤ects
specication. For observational data, the choice of specication between xed and
random e¤ects is complicated by the fact that both random e¤ects specication
(which assumes that rm-specic unobserved heterogeneities i are uncorrelated
with time-invariant rm-specic unobserved variables), and xed-e¤ects specica-
tion (that assumes that those two are correlated), have advantages and drawbacks.
Fixed-e¤ects models are particularly unsuitable for the situations where the main
explanatory variable of interest does not change over time. Since SMALL is our
main variable of interest, we need variations in the values of SMALL to identify
its relationship with productivity.
In India, one of the peculiar characteristics of the manufacturing sector is that
there is very little size mobility over time. This is true in our sample and is
also found out independently by other researchers. In our sample, inter-asset size
mobility is limited  only 5% of the rms move up in the size ladder within a
year and 7% do in a window of two years. Hsieh and Klenow (2012) have also
recently documented how surviving Indian plants exhibit little growth in terms
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of either employment or output. Therefore, random e¤ects specication is more
appropriate for our purpose. Our choice is also bolstered by the fact that we have
a rich dataset and can control for a large number of rm-characteristics that the
extant literature species, alleviating the concerns of omitted variables to a large
extent.
Finally, we have controlled for time xed e¤ects to capture the e¤ects of any
overall economy-wide changes in policy and industry xed e¤ects to capture in-
dustry specic unobserved characteristics.
3.6 Main Results
3.6.1 Firm Size and Total Factor Productivity
Table 3.1 summarizes the main results of the paper. The columns of Table I
present results from the estimation of four variations of equation 1. We start
from estimating the simplest relationship between size and productivity with no
controls (column (1)). We see that there is a strong positive correlation between
belonging to the lowest asset quintile and productivity. Smallest rms are 7% more
productive than their larger counterparts.
Column (2) introduces year and industry xed e¤ects to control for unobserved
industry and time variability. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient estimate standard er-
rors remain almost unchanged. This shows that the relationship is strong across
industries and over time. Column (3) and column (4) present results from the
random e¤ects (generalized least square) models having included the control vari-
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ables. Column (4) includes industry dummies; column (3) does not. For both these
columns, we see that being small means more productive and signicantly so. Co-
e¢ cient estimates go down slightly when we introduce controls to our estimation.
These results are obtained after controlling for a large number of rm characteris-
tics such as government vs. private vs. foreign ownership, holding pattern, import
and export behavior, research and development expenditure and liquidity.
3.6.2 Firm Characteristics and Productivity
Table 3.2 examines which variables are potentially responsible for driving pro-
ductivity for small rms. The three columns report results from random e¤ects
estimation of equation (1). Column (1) shows the e¤ect of size interacted with
a measure of research and development expenditure. The positive and signicant
coe¢ cient provides evidence that small rms that invest more in R&D are more
productive. The second column reports results from specication where rm size
in interacted with a measure of liquidity, cash-in-hand, and shows that small rms
that su¤er less from liquidity constraints are more productive. Finally, the third
column controls for both and shows that both liquidity and R&D are important
drivers of productivity for small rms.
The summary message from Table 3.2 is that being small may have advantages
in terms of leaner and more agile management and more exible operation, but it is
also important to invest in research and be able to maintain enough liquidity to be
productive. As we will see later, liquidity is an important variable in determining
rm survival and exit too.
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3.7 Robustness Checks
3.7.1 Results with an Alternative Denition of TFP
Despite its widespread use, Levinsohn-Petrin method of TFP estimation has been
criticized as being inappropriate under certain conditions, notably by Ackerberg
et al. (2007) who argued that total factor productivity may not be identied sep-
arately from the labor productivity of the former is a deterministic function of the
latter. Wooldridge (2012) gets around this problem by proposing a GMM method
that uses multiple lags, yielding multiple moment conditions for identication. He
goes on to show that even if labor were a deterministic function of productivity,
one can still identify and estimate productivity.
Results using TFP estimates derived from theWooldridge method are presented
in Table 3.3. Only specications from Table 3.1 have been used, as they are our
main results. From row 1, we can see that using an alternative denition of TFP
does not change our core results. Small rms are still signicantly more productive
than their counterparts.
3.7.2 Results with All Five Size Categories
In this section we use all ve size-categories with the smallest size as base category.
This specication allows us to see whether all larger categories are more productive
than the smallest category, or there is some discontinuity in that relationship.
Rows 1-4 of Table 3.4 repeat the key results of row 1 in Table 3.1, controlling for
the same variables. From the sign and signicance pattern of the coe¢ cients of all
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the other size categories, we see that rms belonging to all four categories of rms
larger than the smallest category are (statistically) signicantly less productive
than the smallest category, the base category in this specication. To recall, this
base category is the same as our SMALL category in the previous specication.
Therefore, the message from this table is that even category by category, bigger
rms are less productive signicantly. This test provides a more transparent picture
of the nature of size-productivity relationship reported in the section above.
3.7.3 Results with a Balanced Panel
Table I reports estimation results of equation (1) with an unbalanced panel of
rms. Firms enter and leave industries all the time. However, as discussed in the
earlier section, some exit behavior may bias the sample towards rms with higher
productivity. Therefore, we restrict the sample to rms that stayed on throughout
the sample period of 1994-2007 to form a balanced panel of rms. The results
from estimating the same set of models (except for the single-regressor regressions
to avoid clutter) are presented in table 3.5.
Except for the rst two columns, Table 3.5 is organized in the same way as Ta-
ble 3.1. Evidence in this table also conrms the earlier evidence from unbalanced
panel of rms that small rms are signicantly more productive than their larger
counterparts. The sign and signicance pattern of the other control variables con-
rm that entry and exit of rms do not seem to a¤ect the results in any particular
way.
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3.7.4 Results with a Continuous Measure of Size
Even though size of an enterprise is dened in terms of assets in India, it will be
interesting to investigate how other measures of size are related to productivity.
One such measure is market share share of a rms sales within the industry to
which it belongs. Therefore, instead of a binary variable as SMALL, we now have
a continuous variable market share in equation (1). The rest of the equation is left
unchanged. Results from the estimation of this modied equation are presented in
table 3.6.
Row (1) in Table 3.6 summarizes the main results for the coe¢ cient of interest
here. Market share has a negative and signicant impact across all specications.
This is in line with the previous results with asset size. Since smaller rms are
likely to have lesser market share, the positive small- size high-TFP relationship
is likely to translate to negative market share productivity relationship.
3.8 Caveats
There are some limitations in the data that will a¤ect the interpretation of our
results.
First, we do not have a measure of the human capital of a rm in terms of
education and training of its employees. Therefore, the measure of capital solely
represents physical capital. Though such information can be found in census-based
surveys, such surveys have other issues of misreporting that a balance sheet-based
database does not.
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Second, we cannot provide a complete analysis of exit (and entry). It has been
noted elsewhere also that PROWESS database does not allow tracking entering
and exiting rms with precision. We can only dene exit if a rm disappears
from the dataset. However, rms may drop out from our database for a variety of
reasons. It may become so small that it may not have to report; it may adopt a
di¤erent name, may shift into informality or may actually shutdown.
Similarly, rms may exit and reappear in the database not because they closed
down and reopened again, but simply because they resumed reporting their balance
sheet results (and PROWESS database records them again). However, there is no
evidence of this discrepancy in our sample. The main problem exit behavior creates
is that in retrospect, we may have a selected sample only the rms that are more
e¢ cient survive and if most of the entrant rms are small, which is a reasonable
assumption, then our results will be biased upward because we are looking at the
more e¢ cient rms selectively. This problem is present in survey-based measures
too. To tackle this problem, we look at the exit behavior of rms. The results are
reported in Table 3.7.
The main question here is whether lower-productivity rms are more likely to
exit. That is, we examine the e¤ects of lagged productivity on the binary variable
EXIT that equals unity when a rm ceases to exist in a particular year conditional
on the fact that it was in operation in the previous year. We also control for
other plausible explanations such as size, age, age-squared, net prot, cash ow
and leverage, the last two variables being the proportion of cash in hand and short
term debt to total assets respectively . Columns (1) and (2) report estimated
results from the Linear Probability Model and Probit model respectively.
Table 3.7 shows us that TFP is not a driving force behind rm exit. Small
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rms do exit at a higher rate, which is consistent with ndings in the literature.
Similarly, older rms tend to exit less, another common nding in the literature.
However, rms fail to survive because of their low cash balance. Capital market
in India, despite the recent liberalization is still relatively underdeveloped. Firms
that generate enough cash ow and earn and reinvest prot survive in their re-
spective industries. Hence, we fail to nd evidence that positive productivity-based
selection is driving our results.
3.9 Summary and Policy Implications
In this paper, we have used rm level panel data to estimate the di¤erences in the
productivity of large and small rms in the manufacturing sector in India. Such
exercise has been motivated by several stylized, theoretical, empirical and policy
observations. Firm size heterogeneity is widespread among developing countries.
Mammoth rms coexist with smaller rms and continue to produce similar prod-
ucts. However, theoretically both small and large rms have productivity advan-
tages and disadvantages such as scale economies versus smaller and more exible
management structure. Empirical evidence from the US and the rest of the world
has been piecemeal and mixed. Finally, several countries including India have been
pursuing policies to promote small and medium scale enterprises. With availability
of new rm-level micro data, new evaluation of size-productivity relationship con-
tribute to both researchersand policymakersunderstanding of the implications
of rm size heterogeneity for productivity and growth in the economy.
We calculate total factor productivity by using both Levinsohn-Petrin method
and its modication proposed by Wooldridge to control for simultaneity between
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input choice and productivity shocks. In estimating our main results, we use a
variety of specications. Our results are also robust to a variety of alternative de-
nitions. Finally, we investigate if rm size mobility is driven by lagged productivity
and nd no evidence of such behavior.
Our ndings provide support for policies that aim at encouraging small rms.
However, this does not mean that large rms need to be broken up or rm growth
should be stied or rms should be stopped from being merged or acquired. A
paradoxical result that remains to be explored in future studies is this despite
the productivity advantage, rm growth is largely absent. The answer may lie in
various institutional details such as some government incentive remaining available
to only smaller rms, lack of quality workers and di¢ culty of expanding in size in
an unfriendly regulatory environment can provide some potential explanations.
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Table 3.1: Size-Productivity Relationship - Regression Results for UNBALANCED
PANEL (Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity at Firm-Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Random E¤ects Model
SMALL 0.0748*** 0.0745*** 0.0695*** 0.0694***
(Firms in the lowest 20% in asset size) (0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0071)
Industrial Group Dummy -0.0861 -0.0843
(0.1132) (0.1145)
Ownership Indian Private -0.0204 -0.0136
(0.1127) (0.1142)
Ownership Foreign Private -0.0975 -0.1064
(0.113) (0.1134)
Observations 39886 39886 39822 39822
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: I. All regressions include rm demographics such as age and age squared and
exports, imports and RandD as percentage of sales. II. Ownership is a categorical
variable with categories "Indian private ownership", "foreign private ownership"
"Indian government ownership" respectively. The third one is the base category
in regression. III. Industrial group dummy represents if a rm belongs to a large
industrial house.
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Table 3.2: Firm Characteristics and Productivity (Dependent Variable: Total Fac-
tor Productivity at Firm-Level)
(1) (2) (3)
Random E¤ects Model
SMALL*research_share 0.0052** 0.0053**
(0.0025) (0.0025)
SMALL*Cashow 0.4380* 0.4441*
(0.2289) (0.229)
Constant 0.6500*** 0.6532*** 0.6525***
(0.1397) (0.1397) (0.1396)
Observations 39821 39821 39821
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: I. All regressions include rm demographics such as age and age squared and
exports, imports and RandD as percentage of sales. II. Ownership is a categorical
variable with categories "Indian private ownership", "foreign private ownership"
"Indian government ownership" respectively. The third one is the base category
in regression. III. Industrial group dummy represents if a rm belongs to a large
industrial house.
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Table 3.3: Robustness Check I: Results with TFP Calculated by an Alternative
(Wooldridge) Method (Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity at Firm-
Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Random E¤ects Model
SMALL 0.2051*** 0.3520*** 0.1849*** 0.2934***
(Firms in the lowest 20% in asset size) (0.0691) (0.0600) (0.0674) (0.0592)
Industrial Group Dummy 4.1452*** 0.5817**
(1.4159) (0.2474)
Ownership Indian Private 5.7886*** 1.0520***
(1.3924) (0.2465)
Ownership Foreign Private 1.1183 0.2919
(1.6371) (0.2728)
Observations 26,138 26,138 26,091 26,091
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: I. All regressions include rm demographics such as age and age squared
and exports, imports and R and D as percentage of sales. II. Ownership is a
categorical variable with categories "Indian private ownership", "foreign private
ownership" "Indian government ownership" respectively. The third one is the base
category in regression. III. Industrial group dummy represents if a rm belongs to
a large industrial house.
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Table 3.4: Robustness Check II: Results with all Five Categories of Size (Base is
Smallest) (Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity at Firm-Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Random E¤ects Model
Second Quintile -0.0550*** -0.0565*** -0.0553*** -0.0551***
(0.0092) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0084)
Third Quintile -0.1169*** -0.1197*** -0.1144*** -0.1142***
(0.0124) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0114)
Fourth Quintile -0.1736*** -0.1782*** -0.1676*** -0.1676***
(0.0148) (0.0138) (0.0140) (0.0140)
Fifth Quintile -0.2184*** -0.2225*** -0.2052*** -0.2050***
(0.0162) (0.0149) (0.0153) (0.0153)
Industrial Group Dummy -0.0204 -0.0258*
(0.0159) (0.0140)
Ownership Indian Private -0.0725 -0.0649
(0.1009) (0.1036)
Ownership Foreign Private -0.0969 -0.1042
(0.1010) (0.1017)
Observations 39,886 39,886 39,822 39,822
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: I. All regressions include rm demographics such as age and age squared
and exports, imports and R and D as percentage of sales. II. Ownership is a
categorical variable with categories "Indian private ownership", "foreign private
ownership" "Indian government ownership" respectively. The third one is the base
category in regression. III. Industrial group dummy represents if a rm belongs to
a large industrial house.
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Table 3.5: Robustness Check III: Regression Results for BALANCED PANEL
(Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity at Firm-Level)
(1) (2)
Random E¤ects Model
SMALL (Firms in the lowest 20% in asset size) 0.0875*** 0.0876***
(0.0101) (0.0098)
Industrial Group Dummy -0.0669*** -0.0727***
(0.0154) (0.0266)
Ownership Indian Private 0.1036*** 0.1257***
(0.0132) (0.0165)
Ownership Foreign Private 0.0657*** 0.0655***
(0.0123) (0.0131)
Observations 13496 13496
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E¤ects Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: I. All regressions include rm demographics such as age and age squared
and exports, imports and R and D as percentage of sales. II. Ownership is a
categorical variable with categories "Indian private ownership", "foreign private
ownership" "Indian government ownership" respectively. The third one is the base
category in regression. III. Industrial group dummy represents if a rm belongs to
a large industrial house.
75
Table 3.6: Robustness Check IV: E¤ects of Market Share on Productivity (Depen-
dent Variable: Total Factor Productivity at Firm-Level)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Random E¤ects Model
Firms Market Share -0.3238*** -0.5070*** -0.2384*** -0.3503***
(0.0588) (0.0753) (0.0553) (0.0735)
Exports as % of Sales -0.0003 -0.0003*
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Imports as % of Sales 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Expenditure on Research 0.0002 0.0002
as % of Sales (0.0002) (0.0002)
Industrial Group Dummy -0.0905 -0.0888
(0.1137) (0.1149)
Ownership Indian Private -0.0124 -0.0067
(0.1133) (0.1147)
Ownership Foreign Private -0.1044 -0.1135
(0.1134) (0.1137)
Observations 39,886 39,886 39,822 39,822
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: I. All regressions include rm demographics such as age and age squared
and exports, imports and R and D as percentage of sales. II. Ownership is a
categorical variable with categories "Indian private ownership", "foreign private
ownership" "Indian government ownership" respectively. The third one is the base
category in regression. III. Industrial group dummy represents if a rm belongs to
a large industrial house.
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Table 3.7: Firm Exit Behavior (Dependent Variable: Dummy for EXIT; = 1 if
Firm Exited)
(1) (2)
Linear Model Probit
SMALL 0.075*** 0.575***
(0.007) (0.048)
Lagged TFP 0.001 0.048
(0.006) (0.038)
Age -0.002*** -0.018***
(0.000) (0.003)
Age Squared 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Net Prot -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Cash Flow -0.117** -0.452
(0.052) (0.42)
Leverage 0.012** 0.046
(0.005) (0.031)
Constant 0.000 -2.391***
(0.000) (0.121)
Observations 30920 30920
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX A
ESTIMATION USING EMPLOYMENT AS A MEASURE OF SIZE
In some of the previous literature size is measured in terms of employment.
We measure size of a rm in quintiles of asset size. As mentioned in the paper,
one of the reasons for doing this is the absence of su¢ cient employment data in
a dataset that is balance sheet-based and not plant-level. We however do have
information on the total wage bill and impute employment numbers as described
in the previous appendix. This allows us to examine, albeit imperfectly, how our
results would change when we measure size in terms of employment.
We create size quintiles of our measure of employment by industry and by year.
We then estimate the relation between TFP and (small) size. We use both our
measures of TFP the Levinsohn-Petrin method and the Wooldridge modication
of the Levinsohn-Petrin method. As shown in the table below, TFP is once again
positively correlated to being small. Columns of Table A I are comparable to Table
3.1 and Table 3.3 in the text.
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Table A.1: Results with Size Dened as Quintiles of Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP LP TFP LP-Wooldridge
SMALL 0.0134** 0.0134** 0.1984*** 0.2676***
(Firms in the lowest 20% in employment size) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0446) (0.0433)
Industrial Group Dummy -0.0892 -0.0872 4.1378*** 0.5754***
(0.1135) (0.1148) (1.2306) (0.1892)
Ownership Indian Private -0.0115 -0.0047 5.7828*** 1.0569***
(0.1130) (0.1145) (1.1976) (0.1856)
Ownership Foreign Private -0.1034 -0.1127 1.1106 0.28
(0.1133) (0.1137) (1.3429) (0.2038)
Observations 39,822 39,822 26,091 26,091
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: SMALL is the indicator for rms in the lowest quintile of employment size.
Employment is measured as number of workers in the rm. Number of workers is
estimated by dividing the rmswage bill by average wage per worker. Col 1 and
2 use TFP estimated using the LP method and col 3 and 4 use TFP estimated
using the Wooldridge modicaiton of the LP method.
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED AND DATA
TRANSFORMATIONS
Output: Output is deated sales adjusted for change in inventory and purchase
of nished goods. An increase in inventory is added to sales to arrive at output
while a decrease is subtracted. Purchase of nished goods is dened as nished
goods purchased from other manufacturers purely for resale purpose and is also
subtracted from sales to arrive at the rmsmanufactured output.
Value Added and Input: Value Added is dened as the di¤erence between
output and inputs. The variable input is dened as the sum of material, fuel,
packaging and distribution expenses. Value Added is used in the calculation of
Total Factor Productivity (TFP).
Liquidity: Liquidity is dened as ratio of the di¤erence in current assets and
current liabilities to total assets. Current assets and current liabilities are provided
by Prowess. Current liabilities is dened as the amount owed by a company and due
within one year. It usually represents the liabilities generated from the operations
of the rm and thus includes sundry creditors, bills payable, etc. The variable, total
assets, is dened as the sum of current assets and gross xed assets, investments
and loans and advances. The variable, current assets, is the sum of inventories,
accounts receivable, expenses paid in advance and cash and bank balances.
Leverage: Leverage is dened as the ratio of short term debt to current assets.
Short term debt is the variable in Prowess called current portion of secured and
unsecured borrowings. It includes the portion of the long-term borrowings of banks
that are due within a period of one year of the date of the balance sheet.
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Very Small, Small, Medium, Large and Very Large: These size dummies
are quintiles of assets by industry and by year.
Industry: Dened as the two digit National Industrial Classication (NIC-2)
1998. The NIC 1998 is consistent with the ISIC revision 3 classication.
Total Factor Productivity (TFP): Calculated by the Levinsohn-Petrin
method, uses material as the proxy variable. Both labor and fuel are considered
as freely varying inputs. TFP has been calculated using both output and value
added as the dependent variable.
Labor: Labor is calculated by dividing the compensation to employees by
emoluments per employee. Emoluments per employee is the all industry average
emoluments per employee as given by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO).
CSO is a part of the Ministry of Statistics and Planning.
Capital Stock: Capital stock has been constructed by adding current period
investment to last periods capital stock net of depreciation. Capital has been
depreciated at the rate of 10%.
Ownership: Prowess denes ownership broadly as Government owned (either
Central or State), private sector owned, cooperative sector and joint sector. The
private sector comprises Indian private sector and foreign private sector. Both
Indian and foreign private sector are further divided into Private (Indian /foreign)
and Business groups (Indian/foreign). I have combined the last two categories,
Indian business groups and foreign business houses into one indicator for ownership
by a large business group. The variable takes unit value if the rm is owned by a
large Indian business group or by a foreign business house and zero otherwise. The
category foreign business houses, includes NRI business houses like the Hinduja
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group, and the Ispat (Mittal) group.
Age: Age in any year t, is dened as the year t minus the year of incorporation
of the rm. The variable year of incorporation is not always equal to or more than
the length of the rm in the data. According to the Prowess documentation, year
of incorporation pertains to the most recent incarnation of the company. In the
case of companies that were re-organized, the year of incorporation may not reect
the true age of a company.In such cases, I have taken the age of the rm as the
length of the rms existence in the data.
Indicator for Export participation: The indicator for export participation
takes the value 1 when value of exports for the year exceeds zero. The value of
exports is the sum of exports of goods and of services.
Non exporters, New Entrants, Exiting Exporters and Continuous
Exporters: Firms that do not export in year t-1, t and t + 1 are categorized
as non exporters. Firms that do not export in year t-1 but export in year t and
t+1 are categorized as new entrants. Firms that export in t, t+1 and t-1 are
continuous exporters. Firms that export in time t-1 and t but not in t+1 have
been categorized as rms exiting the export industry.
Classication of NIC -2 digit industry: Prowess gives the National Indus-
trial Classication (NIC) of the rms in its dataset. NIC classication is consistent
with the ISIC rev.3. The classication in some cases is only two digits while in
others it is ve digits. I have maintained a 2-digit classication. The dataset saves
this classication as a number instead of saving it in text format. As a conse-
quence, some of the classications are incorrect as the zero is missing. On careful
examination of the company name and economic activity, I found nineteen such
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codes that were to be preceded by a zero. The NIC codes were then converted to
2-digit.
Classication of industry as manufacturing: Prowess classies the rms
as manufacturing or non-manufacturing. Careful examination showed ve NIC
codes which had been wrongly coded as non-manufacturing. I have changed those
to manufacturing maintaining conformity to ISIC rev3. In my data, there are some
rms that purchase more nished goods than they sell. The variable purchase of
nished goods is greater than sales. These rms have been classied as manufac-
turing though they seem to be traders. I have classied these as non-manufacturing
and removed them from the dataset.
83
APPENDIX C
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ackerberg, D.A., Caves, K., and Frazer, G., (2006). "Structural identication
of production functions", mimeo, UCLA Department of Economics.
Acs, Z. J., & Audretsch, D. B. (1987). "Innovation, market structure, and rm
size." The Review of Economics and Statistics, 69(4), 567-574.
Acs, Z. J., & Audretsch, D. B. (1990). "Innovation and small rms "The MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Ahluwalia, Isher J. (1985). "Industrial Growth in India: Stagnation since the
Mid-Sixties." Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press.
Amiti, Mary and Jozef Konings. (2007). "Trade Liberalization, Intermedi-
ate Inputs, and Productivity: Evidence from Indonesia" The American Economic
Review, 97(5): pp. 1611-1638.
Arellano, Manuel and Stephen Bond. (1991). "Some Tests of Specication for
Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations"
The Review of Economic Studies, 58(2): 277-297.
___________. (1995). "Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Es-
timation of Error-Components Models" Journal of Econometrics, 68(1): 29-51.
Athey, Michael J. and Prem S. Laumas. (1994). "Internal Funds and Corporate
Investment in India" Journal of Development Economics, 45(2): 287-303.
Aw, B. Y. (2002). "Productivity dynamics of small and medium enterprises in
84
taiwan." Small Business Economics, 18(1), 69-84.
Aw, B. Y., Chen, X., & Roberts, M. J. (2001). "Firm-level evidence on pro-
ductivity di¤erentials and turnover in taiwanese manufacturing." Journal of De-
velopment Economics, 66(1), 51-86.
Baily, M. N., Bartelsman, E. J., & Haltiwanger, J. (1996). "Downsizing and
productivity growth: Myth or reality?" Small Business Economics, 8(4), 259-278.
Baldwin, John R. and Wulong Gu. (2003). "Export-Market Participation and
Productivity Performance in Canadian Manufacturing" The Canadian Journal of
Economics / Revue canadienne dEconomique, 36(3): 634-657.
Bandyopadhyay, Arindam and Sandwip K. Das. (2005). "The Linkage between
the Firms Financing Decisions and Real Market Performance: A Panel Study of
Indian Corporate Sector" Journal of economics and business, 57(4): 288-316.
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic. (2005). "Fi-
nancial and Legal Constraints to Growth: Does Firm Size Matter?" The Journal
of Finance, 60(1): 137-177.
Berman, Nicolas and Jérôme Héricourt. (2010). "Financial Factors and the
Margins of Trade: Evidence from Cross-Country Firm-Level Data" Journal of
Development Economics, 93(2): 206-217.
Bernard, Andrew B., Jonathan Eaton, J. B. Jensen, and Samuel Kortum.
(2003). "Plants and Productivity in International Trade" The American Economic
Review, 93(4): 1268-1290.
Bernard, Andrew B. and J. B. Jensen. (2004). "Why some Firms Export" The
85
review of economics and statistics, 86(2): pp. 561-569.
Bigsten, A., & Gebreeyesus, M. (2007). "The small, the young, and the pro-
ductive: Determinants of manufacturing rm growth in Ethiopia." Economic De-
velopment and Cultural Change, 55, 813-840.
Blalock, G., & Gertler, P. J. (2009). "How rm capabilities a¤ect who benets
from foreign technology." Journal of Development Economics, 90(2), 192-199.
Blundell, Richard and Stephen Bond. (1998). "Initial Conditions and Moment
Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models" Journal of Econometrics, 87(1): 115-
143.
Bollard, Albert, Stephen Redding, and Peter K. Schott. (2011). "Multiproduct
Firms and Trade Liberalization" The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(3):
1271-1318.
Bound, J., Cummins, C., Griliches, Z., Hall, B. H., & Ja¤e, A. B. (1982). "Who
does R&D and Who Patents?", NBER Working Paper
Brown, C., & Medo¤, J. (1989). "The employer size-wage e¤ect." The Journal
of Political Economy, 97(5), pp. 1027-1059.
Chamarbagwala, R., & Sharma, G. "Industrial de-licensing, trade liberaliza-
tion, and skill upgrading in India". Journal of Development Economics, In Press,
Corrected Proof.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. (2000). "The separation of own-
ership and control in East Asian corporations." Journal of Financial Economics,
58(1-2), 81-112.
86
Cohen, W. M., & Klepper, S. (1996). "A reprise of size and R & D." The
Economic Journal, 106(437), 925-951.
Cohen, W. M., Levin, R. C., & Mowery, D. C. (1987). "Firm size and R&D
intensity: A re-examination." Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4), 543-565.
Dhawan, Rajeev. (2001). "Firm Size and Productivity Di¤erential: Theory and
Evidence from a Panel of US Firms" Journal of Economic Behavior &Organization,
44(3): 269-293.
Fazzari, Steven M., R. G. Hubbard, Bruce C. Petersen, Alan S. Blinder, and
James M. Poterba. (1988). "Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1988(1): 141-206.
Galindo, Arturo, Fabio Schiantarelli, and Andrew Weiss. (2007). "Does Finan-
cial Liberalization Improve the Allocation of Investment?: Micro-Evidence from
Developing Countries" Journal of Development Economics, 83(2): 562-587.
Gilchrist, Simon and Charles Himmelberg. (1998). "Investment: Fundamentals
and Finance" NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 13: 223-262.
Goldberg, Pinelopi K., Amit K. Khandelwal, Nina Pavcnik, and Petia Topalova.
(2010). "Imported Intermediate Inputs and Domestic Product Growth: Evidence
from India" The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(4): pp. 1727-1767.
Greenaway, David, Alessandra Guariglia, and Richard Kneller. (2007). "Finan-
cial Factors and Exporting Decisions" Journal of International Economics, 73(2):
377-395.
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. (1990). "Trade, Innovation, and
87
Growth" The American Economic Review, 80(2, Papers and Proceedings of the
Hundred and Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association): pp.
86-91.
Gupta, Poonam; Hasan, Rana and Kumar, Utsav. (2008). "What constraints
IndianManufacturing" http://ssrn.com/abstract=1347183 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1347183
Hall, R. E., & Jones, C. I. (1999). "Why do some countries produce so much
more output per worker than others? "The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
114(1), pp. 83-116.
Haramillo, Fidel, Fabio Schiantarelli, and Andrew Weiss. (1996). "Capital
Market Imperfections before and After Financial Liberalization: An Euler Equa-
tion Approach to Panel Data for Ecuadorian Firms" Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 51(2): 367-386.
Hasan, Rana and Jandoc, Karl Robert. (2010) "The Distribution of Firm Size
in India: What can Survey Data Tell Us?" Asian Development Bank Economics
Working Paper Series No. 213. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681268
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1681268
Henderson, R. (1993). "Underinvestment and incompetence as responses to
radical innovation: Evidence from the photolithographic alignment equipment in-
dustry". The Rand Journal of Economics, 24(2), pp. 248-270.
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein. (1991). "Corporate Struc-
ture, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups" The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(1): 33-60.
Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Peter Klenow. (2012). "The Life Cycle of Plants in India
88
and Mexico".
Hubbard, R. G., Anil K. Kashyap, and Toni M. Whited. (1995). "Internal
Finance and Firm Investment" Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 27(3): 683-
701.
Idson, T. L., & Oi, W. Y. (1999). "Workers are more productive in large rms".
American Economic Review, 89(2), 104-108.
Jovanovic, Boyan. (1982). "Selection and the Evolution of Industry" Econo-
metrica, 50(3): 649-670.
Khandelwal, A., & Topalova, P. (2010). "Trade liberalization and rm produc-
tivity: The case of India". Forthcoming, Review of Economics and Statistics.
Kim, J., Lee, S. J., & Marschke, G. (2009). "Relation of rm size to R&D
productivity". International Journal of Business, 8(1), 7-19.
Klenow, P. J., & Rodriguez-Clare, A. (1997). "The neoclassical revival in
growth economics: Has it gone too far?" In B. Bernanke, & G. Rotemberg (Eds.),
NBER macroeconomics annual 1997 (pp. 73-102). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Koeva, Petya and International Monetary Fund. Asia and Pacic Dept. (2003).
"The Performance of Indian Banks during Financial Liberalization". Washington,
D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Levinsohn, James and Amil Petrin. (2003). "Estimating Production Functions
using Inputs to Control for Unobservables" The Review of Economic Studies, 70(2):
317-341.
(2011). "Measuring Aggregate Productivity Growth using Plant-Level Data" .
89
Manova, Kalina. (2010). "Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms, and In-
ternational Trade".
Mathur, K. B. L. (2007). "Financial Sector in India" Economic and Political
Weekly, 42(13): 1098-1101.
Mazumdar, Dipak. (2009). "A Comparative Study of the Size Structure of
Manufacturing in Asian Countries." Asian Development Bank, Manila. Processed
McKinnon, Ronald I. (1973). "Money and Capital in Economic Development".
Washington: Brookings Institution.
Melitz, Marc J. (2003). "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations
and Aggregate Industry Productivity" Econometrica, 71(6): 1695-1725.
Minetti, Raoul and Susan C. Zhu.(2011) "Credit Constraints and Firm Export:
Microeconomic Evidence from Italy" Journal of International Economics, In Press,
Corrected Proof.
Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (2006). The Micro, Small
And Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006
Morris, Sebastian and Rakesh Basant. (2006). "Small-Scale Industries in the
Age of Liberalization.", INRM Policy Brief No. 11: Asian Development Bank.
Muuls, Mirabelle. (2008). "Exporters and Credit Constraints. A Firm Level
Approach", Working Paper Research No 139, National Bank of Belgium.
Nabi, Ijaz. (1989). "Investment in Segmented Capital Markets" The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 104(3): pp. 453-462.
90
Nagaraj, P. (2012). "Financial constraints and export participation". Unpub-
lished manuscript.
Olley, G. S. and Ariel Pakes. (1996). "The Dynamics of Productivity in the
Telecommunications Equipment Industry" Econometrica, 64(6): 1263-1297.
Panagariya, Arvind. (2004). "India in the 1980s and 1990s: A Triumph of
Reforms." International Monetary Fund
Paravisini, Daniel, Veronica Rappaport, Philipp Schnabl and Daniel Wolfen-
zon.(2011)."Dissecting the E¤ect of Credit Supply on Trade: Evidence fromMatched
Credit-Export Data". Unpublished Manuscript.
Roberts, Mark J. and James R. Tybout. (1997). "The Decision to Export in
Colombia: An Empirical Model of Entry with Sunk Costs" The American Eco-
nomic Review, 87(4): 545-564.
Scherer, F. M. (1986). Innovation and growth: Schumpeterian perspectives.
MIT Press Books, 1
Sen, Kunal and Rajendra Vaidya. (1999). "The Process of Financial Liberal-
ization in India." Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sharma, Gunjan (2008)."Competing or Collaborating siblings? Industrial and
trade policies of India". Unpublished Material
Shaw, Edward S. (1973) "Financial Deepening in Economic Development".
New York: Oxford University Press.
Shefer, D., & Frenkel, A. (2005). "R&D, rm size and innovation: An empirical
analysis". Technovation, 25(1), 25-32.
91
Syrneonidis, G. (1996). "Innovation, rm size and market structure: Schum-
peterian hypotheses and some new themes". OECD Economic Studies, 27, 3570.
Syverson, C. (2010). "What determines productivity?" NBER Working Paper.
Topalova, Petia and International Monetary Fund. Asia and Pacic Dept.
(2004). "Overview of the Indian Corporate Sector, 1989-2002". [Washington,
D.C.]: International Monetary Fund.
Tybout, James R. (1983). "Credit Rationing and Investment Behavior in a
Developing Country" Review of economics and statistics.-, 1983: 598-607.
       (2000). "Manufacturing rms in developing countries: How
well do they do, and why?" Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1), 11-44.
Van Beveren, I. (2012). Total Factor Productivity Estimation: A Practical
Review. Journal Of Economic Surveys, 26(1), 98-128.
Van Biesebroeck, J. (2005). "Firm size matters: Growth and productivity
growth in African manufacturing". Economic Development and Cultural Change,
53, 545-583.
Whited, Toni M. (1992). "Debt, Liquidity Constraints, and Corporate Invest-
ment: Evidence from Panel Data" The Journal of Finance, 47(4): 1425-1460.
Williamson, O. E. (1967). "Hierarchical control and optimum rm size". The
Journal of Political Economy, 75(2), 123-138.
Winter, J. K. (1999). "Does rmsnancial status a¤ect plant-level investment
and exit decisions?" Publications 98-48, University of Mannheim.
92
Wooldridge, Je¤rey M. (2009). "On Estimating Firm-Level Production Func-
tions using Proxy Variables to Control for Unobservables" Economics Letters,
104(3), 112-114
93
